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Summary findings
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of unemployment  insurance and social assistance  sector more often. In  addition, these  jobs turn out to be
payments on the duration of unemployment  in the  better matches than those  obtained by nonrecipients
Slovak Republic.  For this purpose, she uses new, very  (with the quality of the match measured by its duration).
detailed data on receipt of benefits from the  Moreover,  the behavior  of recipients varies
Unemployment Registry  (1990-2000) and the Labor  tremendously depending on whether they are actually
Force Survey (1996,  1999,  and 2000).  She employs a  receiving benefits or not. Once their benefits are
flexible methodology that makes it possible to identify  exhausted, they exit the Unemployment  Registry at a
behavioral changes that may occur as the quantity and  higher rate, search more actively, and  move into private
duration of the benefits change over time, as well as  sector jobs more often.  So when these workers  are used
behavioral differences  between recipients and  as their own control group, there is strong evidence that
nonrecipients.  This approach, she argues, constitutes a  both unemployment  insurance and social assistance  or
more accurate test for the presence  of incentive and  support have important  disincentive effects,  not only  on
disincentive  effects than those presented before in the  the duration of unemployment,  but also on job seeking
literature.  She expands the scope  of her analysis  to study  behavior and on exit to employment.
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addition  to exit from unemployment  (for example,  job  social assistance  on poverty,  Sanchez-Paramo  concludes
seeking behavior and duration of unemployment).  that these programs bear most of the burden in the fight
She finds important behavioral  differences  between  against poverty. But this protection does not come free,
those who receive benefits and those who do  not.  since significant disincentive  effects  are associated with
Recipients  tend to spend more time unemployed, but  receiving benefits.  Thus any reform plan should take into
they also look for employment  more actively than their  account both of these aspects of the programs,  along
counterparts,  have more demanding preferences  with  with the government's  goals for the programs.
This paper-a  product  of the  Poverty  Reduction  and  Economic  Management  Sector Unit,  Europe and  Central  Asia
Region-is part of a larger effort in the region to help governments reform safety net systems to make them more efficient
and effective,  without losing a poverty  focus. Copies of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818  H Street
NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Carolina Sanchez-Paramo,  room 18-105, telephone  202-473-2583,  fax 202-
522-0054,  email address csanchezparamo@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web
at http://econ.worldbank.org.  January 2002. (60 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to  get the findings out quickly, even if  the presentations  are less than fully polished. The
papers  carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination  CenterUnemployment, Skills, and  Incentives. An Overview of the Safety
Net System in the Slovak Republic
Carolina Sanchez-Paramo
This  is  a  background  paper  for  the  Slovak  Republic:  Poverty,  Employment  and  Labor Market Study.  The  views
contained  herein  are  those  of the  author only, and  do not  represent  the  opinions of the  World  Bank nor of its  Board  of
Directors,  nor of any individual  country member, nor federal, nor local government.  The author takes  full responsibility for
any and all errors of fact or interpretation.
1Table of Contents
1.  Introduction  3
II.  Unemployment  and the Unemployed  4
III.  Overview of the Unemployment Insurance, Social Assistance and Social
Support systems  5
- Unemployment Insurance  6
- Social Assistance and Social Support  7
IV.  Brief analysis of the disincentives provided by Unemployment Insurance,
Social Assistance and Social Support  8
- A single individual  9
- A couple with two small children  10
- A couple with five children  12
V.  Data  13
- Unemployment Registry  data  13
- Labor Force Survey  14
VI.  Empirical Strategy  and Some Methodological  Issues  15
- A guide to the empirical strategy  16
- Some methodological comments  17
VII.  Results  18
- Unemployment Insurance, Social Assistance and unemployment duration  18
- Exit-to-employment  22
- Job search and job/match quality  24
VIII.  Discussion and policy implications  29
References  3  1
Annex I. Unemployment and the unemployed.  Tables.  33
Annex II. Examples of the income  coverage provided by the safety net.  35
Annex III. Additional tables.  38
Tables and Graphs  42
Tables and Graphs for Boxes  1, 2, and 3  65
2A.  INTRODUCTION
1.  Since the late 1980s,  Central and Eastern  European countries have experienced rapid
and substantial  economic  transformations  as part of the transition process  from a centralized
planning  system  to  a  new  competitive  market  economy.  Along  with such  changes,  these
countries  have  had  to  adjust  their  institutional  structure  to  the  new  circumstances.  In the
context of the labor market, this implied that a social security system had to be set up to cope
with  the  new  phenomenon  of unemployment,  since  workers  laid off by  contracting  firms
were not immediately rehired by expanding  or newly created businesses.  Moreover,  having
to  deal  with  a new  system  of unemployment  benefits  and  social  assistance  schemes  in  a
rapidly evolving environment  caused numerous countries to change the system several times
during the  1990s.
2.  The  case  of the  Slovak  Republic  responds  closely  to  the  model  described  above.
After independence  from  the  Czech Republic  in  1993,  the Slovak government  inherited the
social  security system  in place in the former Czechoslovakia.  Then,  during the  1990s,  they
modified most programs in response to changing economic, political,  and social conditions.
3.  Like  other  social  security  systems,  the  role  of the  Slovak  system  is  twofold.  It
provides income  for those who  are not employed and whose income  falls below the poverty
level,'  and  gives  them  social  protection.  On  the  other  hand,  it  aims  to  stimulated  these
individuals to  find  a job  and  obtain their  own  means of subsistence.  As argued by  Steele
(World Bank,  2001c),  the  safety net has been  tremendously  effective  in achieving  the first
goal.  Poverty  in  Slovakia  would  increase  from  10  to  19  percent  were  social  assistance-
support and unemployment  insurance to disappear.2
4.  However,  so  far  not  a  lot  of  research  has  been  done  on  the  potential
incentives/disincentives  effects  of the  Slovak  safety  net.  Lubyova  and  van  Ours  (1997)
examine the effects of unemployment insurance reforms  on the exit rate from unemployment
and  argue  that  the  tightening  and  loosening  of the  system  did  not  affect  re-employment
probabilities very much.  In a  different paper, they also find that there are no  disincentives
effects  associated  with unemployment  insurance  and  social  assistance  recipiency  (Lubyova
and van Ours,  1998).
5.  In  contrast,  Erbenova  et alia  (1998)  show that,  in  the  case  of the  Czech  Republic,
"social assistance  benefits are fairly generous  for low income families  with many children",
and that  "individuals  with these  characteristics  tend to  stay  unemployed  longer than  those
with fewer dependents", hence concluding that there  are disincentives effects  associated with
social assistance for some groups of the population.
6.  In this paper we revisit this issue  in the context of the Slovak  Republic,  using new,
very  detailed data on benefits recipiency  from the Unemployment  Registry (1990-2000)  and
the  Labor  Force  Survey  (1996,  1999  and 2000).  In order  to do  so,  we propose  a flexible
methodology that allows us to identify behavioral changes that may occur as the quantity and
1 Although there is no  official poverty  line in the Slovak  Republic,  the  Minimum  Living Standard  (MLS)  is
used as such for the purpose of benefit eligibility, etc.
2  It is important to notice that the total income  figures used for this calculation include  pensions.
3duration  of the  benefits  change  over  time,  in  addition  to  behavioral  differences  between
benefit recipients  and non-recipients  - we will  argue  that  this  approach  constitutes  a more
accurate test for the presence  of incentive/disincentive  effects.  We also expand the scope  of
our  analysis  to  study  the  effect  of  recipiency  on  several  outcomes  besides  exit  from
unemployment (e.g. unemployment duration, job search).
7.  We  find that there  are  important behavioral  differences  between  those  who  receive
benefits  and those who do not.  The former tend to spend more  time unemployed,  but they
also  look  for  employment  more  actively  than  their  counterparts,  have  more  demanding
preferences  regarding  their  future jobs,  and  find jobs  in the  private  sector  more  often.  In
addition,  these jobs turn  out to be better  matches  than the  ones obtained  by non-recipients
(where match quality is measured as duration of the match).
8.  Moreover,  the behavior of recipients varies tremendously  depending on whether they
are  actually receiving  benefits  or not.  In particular,  they  exit the  registry at  a higher  rate,
search  more  actively,  and  move  into  private-sector  jobs  more  often,  once  benefits  are
exhausted.  So  when we use these  workers  as their  own control  group,  we  do  find strong
evidence  that both unemployment  insurance  and  social  assistance/support  have  important
disincentive effects, not only on unemployment duration,  but also on search behavior and on
exit-to-employment.
9.  The remaining of the paper is structured as follows.  Section B briefly describes  the
evolution of unemployment as well as the characteristics  of the unemployed,  comparing them
to the rest of the population.  Section  C provides  an  overview  of the  main  features  of the
unemployment  insurance,  social  assistance  and  social  support  programs,  and  section  D
discusses  some  examples  that  illustrate  the  potential  disincentive  effects  associated  with
them.  The  data is presented  in section E,  and the empirical  strategy  in section  F, together
with  some  methodological  issues.  Section  G  contains  the  results,  and  finally  section  H
concludes  with a discussion of such results and their policy implications.
B.  UNEMPLOYMENT  AND  THE UNEMPLOYED3
10.  Unemployment in the Slovak Republic increased  sharply after the transition, reaching
13 percent  in  1993,  and remained  fairly  stable until  1997.  Since then it has been  growing
quite  substantially,  up  to  a  record  high  of  18.7  percent  in  the  first  semester  of 2000.
Moreover,  all  throughout  this  period,  registered  unemployment  has  been  higher  than
unemployment  measured  by  the  Labor  Force  Survey,  with  the  exception  of 2000.  This
discrepancy  is  believed  to  reflect  the  potential  disincentive  effects  associated  with  the
unemployment  insurance  and  social  assistance  systems,  especially  since  most  of  the
difference  between both rates is due to the group of short-term and medium term unemployed
(Lubyova,  2000).
11.  In combination  with the growing  incidence of unemployment,  more than  50 percent
of all unemployed  individuals  have been  so  for more than  a year.  The  share of long-term
unemployment  has been quite stable over time, and hence not very responsive to neither the
business cycle nor reforms of the safety net.  The fraction of long-term unemployed is higher
3  All tables corresponding to Section B are shown in Annex I.
4among men than women,  probably because the latter have a higher probability of leaving the
labor force after a long unemployment spell.
12.  Labor  market  dynamics  are  weak.  The  flows  in  and out of the  pool  of registered
unemployment are very  low, around 7-9 percent of all unemployed  workers,  and as a result,
unemployment  turnover  is also  very  low.  Moreover,  a  large  fraction  of those  leaving  the
unemployment  pool (outflow),  leave  this  state  by withdrawing  from  the labor  force  rather
than by joining  the  files  of the  employed.  This  situation  is quite  common  in  Central  and
Eastern Europe:  according to Boeri (2000), about one third of the workers that leave the state
of unemployment do not find a new job, but simply stop looking for one.
13.  While  unemployment rates do not exhibit particular gender disparities (rates  are only
slightly  higher  for  women),  they  vary  widely  with  age  and  education.  As  expected,
unemployment  rates  are  negatively  correlated  with  education.  Workers  with  higher
education or college degrees perform  much better than those with primary or even secondary
studies (3-5 percent unemployment  compared to  15-20 percent)
14.  From  1994 to  1998, almost one  quarter of those under 25  was unemployed,  and this
number  has  increased  to  35  percent  in  2000.  Not  surprisingly  the  largest  increases  in
unemployment  over time have occurred  among  young workers,  both men and women.  The
situation  is  somewhat  better  among prime-age  workers,  although  unemployment  has been
increasing  among them  steadily (1 lpercent  in  1994 compared to  16  percent in 2000).  This
has raised concerns  since  this group  is generally viewed to be the most productive,  besides
bearing family responsibilities.
*15.  In this respect, it is important to notice that unemployment rates vary substantially by
the position that individuals  hold within the household.  Those who are  considered heads of
the household  (i.e. primary earners  in most cases) exhibit the lowest unemployment rates (14
percent  in 2000),  although unemployment  has  increased  by  almost  100 percent  among this
group since  1996.  Spouses have also  experienced  an increase in unemployment,  although  a
relative  smaller one so that their situation in 2000 closely resembles that of the heads  of the
household.  On  the  other  hand,  high  unemployment  among  other  household  members  is
largely a reflection of the higher unemployment  incidence among younger workers,  since this
group consists mainly of children of working age who still reside with their parents.
16.  Finally, the Slovak labor market is highly segmented  at the regional  level, and such a
segmentation  has only grown over time.  This  is evident when we  look at the  evolution  of
unemployment  rates  for different  regions.  In  1996,  the  difference  between  the region  with
the  highest unemployment  level  and that with the  lowest was  less than  6 percentage  points,
while that number is close to 20 percentage points in 2000.
C.  OVERVIEW OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE,  SOCIAL ASSISTANCE  AND SOCIAL
SUPPORT SYSTEMS
17.  The  Slovak  Republic  provides  cash  benefits  and support  services  to  many jobless
individuals and families through a web of programs.  The scope of these programs as well  as
their  coverage  are  broad  and  generous,  even  for  European  standards,  with  total  cash
payments exceeding SK95 billion, or  14 per cent of GDP, in 1999.
518.  The  system  as  it  stands  today  is  the  product  or  numerous  reforms,  implemented
throughout  the last decade.  Such  changes have  not only had budgetary  repercussions,  but
have  also altered the rules of the  game  for the unemployed.  Hence,  in order to  analyze the
effect that these programs may have on individual  actions,  it is important to become  familiar
both with the evolution  of the system and with the way in which  benefits  are calculated.  In
this section, we provide an overview of the main elements that conform the social  safety net
(i.e. the Unemployment  Insurance  (UI), the Social Assistance  (SA), and the Social Support
(SS) systems,4) and of the most important changes that have occurred since  1991.
Unemployment  Insurance system
19.  After  its creation in  1993,  the country  inherited the unemployment insurance  system
in  place  in  the  former  Czechoslovakia.  A  system  which  had  already  undergone  a  major
reform  in  1992,  due to  soaring payments  associated with  growing unemployment.  At that
time  the  original  12-month  entitlement  period  was  halved  and  eligibility  conditions  were
tightened.  Replacement ratios also decreased  slightly (Table  I). These  changes were applied
retroactively  onto  old entitlements  as  well  as  onto  new  ones,  and  they  implied  for many
unemployed  an  earlier  switch  from non  means-tested  unemployment  insurance  to means-
tested social assistance/support  benefits.
20.  Contrary  to  what  other  transition  economies  were  doing  at  the  time,  the  Slovak
government  relaxed  the  unemployment  insurance  system  in  1994-97,  a  period  of high
growth, partially reversing the steps taken in 1992.  In particular,  entitlement conditions  went
back to pre-1992 levels, and the duration of the benefits was lengthened according to the age
of the unemployed.  Replacement  ratios were kept constant except for those with no previous
work experience,  who saw their  benefits  decrease  from  60  to  45  percent  of the minimum
wage, and those involved in -public- retraining programs, who lost their privileged status.
21.  These  measures  caused  a  partial  shift  from  social  assistance  to  unemployment
insurance, reversing the previous  trend, and coincided  in time with changes  in the safety net
financing  mechanism.  While  initially  all  benefits  were  financed  through  the  government
budget,  in  1994  unemployment  insurance  became  the  responsibility  of  the  so  called
Employment  Fund,  supported by the  insurance  contributions  of employers  and  employees.
This  meant  that  the  relaxation  of the  unemployment  insurance  system  had  no  adverse
budgetary  effects  (in fact, public  expenditure  actually  decreased  after the changes),  and this
no  doubt  contributed  to the  oversight  of potential  disincentive  effects  associated  with the
proposed reforms.
22.  In  1998,  with  the  economy  slowing  down  and  unemployment  growing  again,  a
second round of restrictive reforms  came  around.  Benefit duration was  made a function of
the contributive history of the individual, rather than her age; a measure most likely to affect
those with interrupted labor market careers (i.e.  women).  In addition, the entitlement  period
was  cut by three months for those who had quitted their job voluntarily and without serious
reason.
4  We ignore the social insurance system, comprising sickness and disability insurance and the pension system.
623.  Similar changes  were  implemented  in  1999,  shaping  the  system  as  it stands today.
Entitlement duration was reduced to 6 months for those having contributed for a maximum of
15  years,  and  9  months  for those  with more than  15  years  of contributions.  Replacement
ratios  were  cut,  while  the  maximum  benefit  payment  became  a  function of the  Minimum
Living  Standard  (i.e.  poverty line),  rather  than  the  minimum  wage.  Finally,  conditions  for
entitlement  were  relaxed  slightly by requiring  6 months of contribution  history during the 3
years prior to the benefit claim, instead of 12.
24.  The  share  of unemployed receiving  benefits  has  fallen  sharply as  a consequence  of
the  reforms, from  82 percent  in  1991,  to 33 percent in  1992,  and 27 percent  in  1999 (Table
II).5  However,  such a decrease has been vastly compensated by an increase  in the number of
social assistance/support  recipients  among  the unemployed,  so that overall  almost the  same
percentage of the unemployed received help from the state in  1999 than in 1993.
25.  Furthermore,  total  annual  expenditure  in  unemployment  benefits  has  increased
substantially,  from  SK1.7  billion  in  1992  to  SK7.2  billion  in  1999  (Table  III).  This is  a
reflection  of both  the  growth  in  the  absolute  number  of unemployed  workers  receiving
unemployment  insurance,  from 87,322  in  1992 to  144,690 in  1999,  as well  as an  84 percent
increase  in  the  average  monthly  benefit  during  the  same  period  (from SK1,583/month  to
SK2,916/month).
26.  After  revising  these  facts,  it  seems  that,  more  often  than  not,  changes  in  the
unemployment insurance  system have responded to the evolution of the macroeconomy  or to
budgetary  concerns,  rather  than to the  need  for  a rationally  designed  and  efficient  system.
Unfortunately,  this  policy  has  done  little  to  minimize  the  potential  disincentive  effects
associated with unemployment  insurance  benefits.  We will return  to this point in the next
section.
5  It is  important to notice that these numbers represent the fraction of unemployed  workers who are receiving
Ul in any given year, and not the fraction of unemployed workers who are  entitled to UI at the beginning of the
spell.  This figure is actually  much higher (see Section E)
7Social Assistance  and Social Support
27.  Unemployed workers  who are not eligible  for Unemployment  Insurance  are covered
by the  Social  Assistance  and  Social  Support  systems,  designed  to  guarantee  basic  living
conditions for everyone.6 , 7  Under  this principle,  social  assistance/support  and  SS benefits
are calculated with reference to the subsistence  level (i.e. Minimum Living Standard,  MLS).
The concept of a MLS was  introduced by legislation in  1991.  Its level is a function of the
individual's age and position within the household,  and it is adjusted according to the cost-
of-living index for low income households.  In particular,  an adjustment  is made when this
index  increases  10  percent  or  more.  Because  this process  is not automatic,  during  certain
periods the MLS has been very close to the minimum wage, which may have had a negative
effect on the incentives of the unemployed to actively look for a job.
28.  The total number of individuals receiving social assistance/support  benefits increased
from  199,127  to 297,688  between  1994  and  1999  (Table  IV).8  Most of this  growth  has
occurred  in the last 2-3 years and among couples with dependent children.  Simultaneously,
during  1994-99,  expenditure  went  from  SK5.1  to SKI 1.6  billion  and the average  monthly
payment grew from SK2,130 to SK3,426 - a 60 percent  increase.
29.  As a complement to the social assistance/support  benefits, the SS system grants child
and  parental  allowances,  both  of which  are  among  the  programs  most  often  blamed  for
providing  disincentives  to job  search,  and further employment.  These benefits  are usually
means-tested, which implies that there exists a threshold for household income,9 above which
marginal increases  in labor income will cause an absolute decrease in total income due to the
loss of the  allowance.  Moreover,  both child and parental  allowances  require the qualifying
person  to provide  care for the dependent child.  That  is, a parent who  finds  a job and starts
working loses the allowance.
30.  Child  allowances  are  granted  independently  for  each  child  in  the  family,  and  the
quantity of the benefit varies according to the household income and the age of the child.  As
a  result,  disincentives  increase  with  the  number  and  age  of children.  The  number  of
recipients  has  over time,  from 682,045  in  1995  to  568,951  in  1999,  as so has  expenditure
6  Basic conditions  are described  as "one  hot meal  per  day,  necessary  clothing  and  shelter"  (Social Policy,
2000).
'  Under the SA system, the needy are classified with respect to the reason for their depravation,  and the amount
of the benefits depends  on the  type of need.  Individuals  can be in objective need if they are "trying to help
themselves"  (e.g. registered at the unemployment office and actively searching for a job), or in subjective need
if they are not doing so.  The former represent  64 percent of all recipients  and receive the  full MLS, while the
latter (29 percent) are paid only  50 percent of the MLS.  Finally, in the case of employment,  income is topped
up  by  social  benefits  to  a  1.2-multiple  of the MLS  (This  premium  for  employed  individuals  is  about  to
disappear,  since  the  reform  currently  under  discussion  in  Congress  does  not  contemplate  such  a measure
anymore.  The authorities believe that incentives  to work should arise from the wage structure rather than from
payments received from the State).
s  SA payments are formally administered for two broad reasons:  assistance to families with dependent children
and assistance  to socially  deprived  persons.  Couples  with dependent  children constitute  the largest  group  of
recipients,  growing  from  90,718  individuals  in  1994  to  202,805  in  1999.  Couples/individuals  without
dependent  children are  the second  largest group  of beneficiaries,  with their number  increasing at  a lower rate
over this period from 89,214 to 93,799 (Table IV).
9 In fact there are two such thresholds for each household:  1.36 and  1.99 of  the corresponding  MLS.
8(from  SKIO  to  SK9  billion  over  the  same  period).  These  trends  have  translated  into  a
moderate  8  percent  increase  in  the  average  monthly  allowance,  which,  given  inflation,
corresponds to a fall in real terms (Table V).
31.  Parental  allowances  are  only  applicable  to  children  under  the  age  of  three,  a
restrictive  condition  for  a population  with a  very low fertility  rate.  As a consequence,  the
number of recipients  has also  been  falling over  time,  from  154,012  in  1995  to  137,931  in
1999.  Expenditure,  however,  has exhibited a positive trend during the same period, growing
from  SK2.5  to  SK4.4  billion.  Altogether  this  translates  into a  100 percent  increase  in the
average monthly benefit.
D.  BRIEF ANALYSIS  OF THE DISINCENTIVES  PROVIDED BY UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE,
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE,  AND  SOCIAL SUPPORT
32.  The  ample  coverage  provided  by  the  unemployment  insurance  and  social
assistance/support/SS  systems,  sometimes  for unlimited  periods  of time,  is  likely to have
disincentive  effects  on job  search  and re-employment.  In addition,  the co-existence  of all
these  different  programs  makes  the  Slovak  safety  net  a  complex  system,  both  for  its
administrators  and  its  beneficiaries,  and  such  complexity  could  create  undesirable
opportunities for unintended misuse or even fraud.
33.  Our  goal  in  this  section  is  to  evaluate  the potential  magnitude  of the  disincentive
effects associated with the different  safety net programs, and to identify,  through a series of
quantitative  examples,  those  program  features  most likely to cause  such  effects,  as well as
those groups  of workers  most susceptible  to them.  We consider  only individuals  who  are
unemployed  and  receive  social benefits.  According  to the  type of benefits  each  person  is
entitled  to,  we  contemplate  three  different  regimes:  (i)  receiving  high-replacement
unemployment  insurance,  (ii) receiving  low-replacement  unemployment  insurance,  or  (iii)
receiving  social  assistance/support/SS.  In  each  case,  we  calculate  the  worker's  (adult  1,
henceforth)  income  while receiving  benefits  and compare  it to the income  level  she would
enjoy  were  she  working.  We  then  grant  child allowances  whenever  individuals  or  their
families  are  eligible,  and repeat the  exercise using  household  income.10 Such  comparisons
can  be thought  of as  'replacement  ratios'  and provide  a  crude way  of describing  potential
disincentive effects both at the individual and the household levels.
34.  In  order  to  calculate  unemployment  insurance  benefits  and  income  after  re-
employment,  we need to make some  assumptions  about the worker's past and future wages.
We  assume both  wages  are  the same  and consider  two  different  levels:  (i) the  minimum
wage  (SK3,600  in 2000),  and  (ii)  the average  wage (SKIO,950  in 2000).  Besides  income
imputations, these wages also play a role as rough proxies for the worker's level of skills and
education;  the idea being that individuals with low education and/or skill levels will be much
more  likely  to  find  a job  that  pays  a  low  salary  than  those  with  more  skills  or  higher
education.  This  distinction  is important  because  the  difference  between the  MLS  and the
10  Household  income  is calculated  as income generated  or benefits received by adult  I + income generated  or
benefits received  by adult 2 + other household-level  benefits.  For the  sake of simplicity,  we ignore  important
elements  such,  as taxes  or parental  allowances,  in the calculation.  For more precise  measures  of income under
different programs the reader can consult Ludyova and van Ours (1998).
9minimum wage is small, and therefore there are reasons to believe that disincentives  effects
may  be  stronger  for  workers  with  little  qualification  than  for those  with  higher  levels  of
education.
35.  In addition, we consider three different situations for a potential second adult living in
the  household  - e.g.  the  individual's  spouse  (adult  2,  henceforth):  (i)  unemployed,  (ii)
employed at the minimum wage,  or (iii) employed at the average wage.  The purpose  of this
division  is twofold.  On  the  one hand,  it allows  us to  think of adult  1 as the  primary  or
secondary earner of the household,  depending on his/her relative income-generating  position
with  respect  to that  of adult  2.  On  the  other  hand,  it makes  it  easy  to  bring  in  strategic
considerations: in general, the opportunity cost of employment  is higher in those cases when
the second  adult  in the household  is already  working,  because  the  family would  lose  any
child allowance they may have been receiving.
36.  We perform the exercise described above for six different types of households:
(a)  A single individual;
(b)  A couple without children;
(c)  A couple with two small children (below age 6);
(d)  A couple with two young children (ages between  15 and 25);
(e)  A couple with five children (as a proxy for a Roma household); and
(f)  A couple with two young children living with a pensioner.
37.  Although  the  conclusions  outlined  at the  end  of this  section  are  applicable  to the
totality of the cases, we concentrate here on those ones we consider most illuminating, hence
keeping the text free of too much numerical detail.'1 First, we discuss the case  of a single
individual as a mode of benchmark.  We then  look at a couple with two small children  who
may be  eligible  for child allowance  and,  therefore,  more exposed  to potential  disincentive
effects.  Finally,  we  study  the  case of a couple  with five young  children  in an attempt  to
capture the specificities of a Roma household.
38.  Results  in all  three  cases  are  presented  in  a  similar  manner.  Separate  tables  are
produced  for different adult 2's labor market statuses.  In each table, columns  correspond  to
different adult  1  's benefit regimes and rows correspond  to different adult  1  's re-employment
situations  (AW: average  wage,  MW: minimum  wage).  In addition, every  cell contains two
numbers.  The  top one  is the estimated  individual  (adult  1) or household  income,  and the
bottom  one  (in  parentheses)  is  the  ratio  of that  figure  to  income  after  adult  l's  re-
employment.
"  The remaining cases are presented in Annex II.
10A single individual.
39.  An  individual  who used to earn the  average  wage  receives  SK5,400  during her first
three months  of unemployment,  and SK4,297  for the rest of the entitlement period.12 This
amounts  to  49  and  45  percent  of her  potential  wage  in  case  of re-employment.  Once
unemployment insurance  ends, she receives the minimum subsistence level for a single adult,
or 29 percent of her potential  labor income.
Benefit  regime  UI  UI  SA/SS
First 3 months  After first 3 months  (Objective)
Income  (RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Adult I's income  (AW)  5,400  4,927  3,230
(0.49)  (0.45)  (0.29)
Adult l's income  MW)  3,230  3,230  3,230
(0.90)  (0.90)  (0.90)
40.  The situation of a  worker who  was previously  making the minimum  wage  is rather
different.  Since  the  unemployment  insurance  benefit  she  is  entitled  to  fall  below  the
minimum  subsistence  level,  social  assistance/support  complements  these  payments  for  as
long as the worker remains unemployed (and in objective need).  In particular,  she receives
SK3,230  as unemployment  insurance  and/or  social  assistance/support,  which  represents  90
percent of her income after re-employment  at the minimum wage.
A couple  with two small children
41.  We  assume that both children are under the age of 6.  In this case,  the household  is
entitled to SK1,260/monthl3  in the form of child allowances if their total income is below a
1.36-multiple of the MLS, or SK840/month if it is between a 1.36- and a  1.99-multiple of the
MLS, as long as one of the parents stays at home taking care of the children..  The MLS for a
family of four of these characteristics  is SK8,410.
Adult  2 unemployed or out of the labor  force.
42.  We first assume that adult 2 makes no monetary contribution to family income (i.e. he
does  not  work  nor  receive  unemployment  insurance).  Then  adult  l's  income  and
replacement  ratios  are  the  same  as  above.  Household  income  falls  below  the  minimum
subsistence  level,  and  this  implies  that  the  family  qualifies  for  social  assistance/support
benefits,  as  well  as  for  the  highest  possible  child  allowance.  In  receiving  all  payments,
family  income  becomes  SK9,670,  which  represents  79  percent  of its potential  level  were
adult  1 to work for the average  wage,  and a  100 percent were  she to work  at the minimum
wage.
12  Notice that UI benefits are capped at a 1.5-multiple of the minimum wage (or, most recently, the subsistence
level).
13  For both children.
1143.  When  interpreting  these  results,  it  is  important  to  notice  that,  since  one  adult  2
remains  unemployed,  the household  is  still  entitled  to child  allowances  and  the proposed
'replacement  ratios' are really the lower bound of all possible values.
Benefit  regime  UI  UT  SA/SS
First 3 months  After first 3 months  (Objective)
Income  (RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Adult l's income (AW)  5,400  4,927  3,230
(0.49)  (0.45)  (0.29)
HH income (AW)  9,670  9,670  9,670
(0.79)  (0.79)  (0.79)
Adult l's income (MW)  3,230  3,230  3,230
(0.90)  (0.90)  (0.90)
RH income (MW)  9,670  9,670  9,670
(1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)
Adult 2 employed  at average wage
44.  When the adult 2 is paid the average wage, adult I can be thought of as the secondary
earner in the  household.  He still  receives the same  amounts in the form  of unemployment
insurance,  but he no longer qualifies for social assistance/support  since household income is
above the minimum subsistence level.
45.  As  long  as  one  of the  adults  remains  unemployed,  the  family  qualifies  for  child
support,  so this payment is included in the calculation of household income during adult l's
unemployment,  but  excluded  after  re-employment.  Then,  assuming  he  could  obtain
employment at the average wage level, the household replacement ratio is 78-76 percent with
unemployment insurance, and 56 percent without it.  These numbers increase up to 94 and 84
percent, respectively, when he expects to work at the minimum wage.
Benefit  regime  UI  UI  SA/SS
First 3 months  After first 3 months  (Objective)
Income  (RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Adult l's income (AW)  5,400  (0.45)
17,190  16,717  12,210
HR income (AW)  (0.78)  (0.76)  (0.56)
Adult l's income (MW)  1,800  1,620  0 Adult  l's  income  ~~  (0.50)  (0.45)
HH income (MW)  13,590  13,410  12,210
(0.94)  (0.93)  (0.84)
Adult 2 employed at minimum wage.
46.  The perverse effects  associated with safety net payments are stronger when adult 2 is
employed  at the minimum wage, rather than the average wage,  since the household  qualifies
for both social assistance/support  and child allowances.  At the individual level the situation
is  identical  to the one where  adult  2 is  also unemployed.  If adult  I can earn  the average
12wage,  the replacement  ratio varies  from 49-45 percent  while  on unemployment  insurance  to
29  percent  with  social  assistance/support,  and these  numbers  become  90  percent  if he  can
only get a minimum-wage job.
47.  Similarly,  in the first case, the household replacement ratio is around 70 percent when
receiving  unemployment  insurance  and  67  percent  otherwise,  while  in  the  second  these
numbers  go  up  to  112  percent.  This  implies  that total  household  income  would  actually
decrease  as  a  result  of the  adult  l's re-employment  due  to  the  loss  of child  allowances.
Notice that this is also the  reason why the replacement ratio here is actually higher than that
calculated  for case A.
Benefit regime  UI  UI  SA/SS
First 3 months  After first 3 months  (Objective)
Income  (RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
5,400  4,927  3,230
Adult l's income  (AW)  (0.49)  (0.45)  (0.29)
HH income (AW)  10,260  9,787  9,670
HH  income  (AW)  ~~(0.71)  (0.67)  (0.67)
Adult l's income  (MVV)  3,230  3,230  3,230
Adult  l's  income  (MW)(0.90)  (0.90)  (0.90)
HU income (MW)  9,670  9,670  9,670
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  (1.12)  (1.12)  (1.12)  .
A couple with five  children.
48.  This third example  intends to reproduce the setup of a generic Roma household.  For
this  purpose,  given  that  the  average  number  of children  among  Roma  families  is  4.2,
compared  to  1.2  for  non-Roma  households,  we  consider  a large  family  with  five  young
children.  We  assume  that  all  five  lack  any  means  of  subsistence,  and  that  their  age
distribution  is as  follows:  one of them  is  under  3,  one  more  is between  3 and 6,  two  are
between  6  and  15,  and the eldest if above  15.  These  differences  allow for variation  in the
amount  of  the  child  allowance  corresponding  to  each  child,  and  help  us  bring  into  the
analysis the disincentives  associated not only with the number of children, but with their age.
A look at the structure of child allowance payments will make this point clear:
*  Up to 6 years of age:  SK640/month
*  6-15 years: SK790/month
*  Above  15 years:  SK840/month
49.  Moreover,  because  education  levels are very  low among this group and traditionally
Roma women  do not work outside  the house,  we only  consider the case where  adult  1 was
previously  employed  at the  minimum  wage  and adult 2  is unemployed  or out of the  labor
force.
1350.  Under  the  above  assumptions  and  rules,  the  minimum  subsistence  level  for  this
family is SK12,790,  and child allowances  can amount to SK3,700/month.  This implies that
if both  adults  are  unemployed  the  full  household  monthly  income  is  SK16,490.  Most
important,  should  one  of them  find  employment  at the minimum  wage  level,  that  amount
would  continue  to be  the  same  because  social  assistance/support  would  complement  their
income  to bring  it up to the minimum  subsistence  level,  and the family  would still receive
child allowances.  In these circumstances,  there  is very little reason for either adult to  look
for a job, and  even less  so for both of them to do so,  since that would deprive the  famil  of
child allowances,  making them worse off overall.
Benefit  regime  UI  UT  SA/SS
First 3 months  After first 3 months  (Objective)
Income  (RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Adult l's income (MW)  3,230  3,230  3,230
(0.90)  (0.90)  (0.90)
HH income (MW)  16,490  16,490  16,490
I__  _  _ (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)
51.  Even though each example has its own specificities,  a few general conclusions  can be
drawn from the analysis:
(a)  Individuals  who  expect to be re-employed  at the minimum wage  level have
few incentives  to look for a job (except maybe those whose spouse  works for
the average  wage).  Moreover,  if we  are  willing  to  accept  that workers  on
minimum-wage jobs are most likely workers with low levels of education, this
means  that  the  disincentive  effects  of unemployment  insurance  and  social
assistance/support  should be strongest for this group;
(b)  Disincentives  are  stronger  when  receiving  unemployment  insurance  than
when  receiving  social  assistance/support  because  the  payments  are  larger
under the former (i.e. replacement ratios are higher).  However,  the unlimited
duration of social assistance/support,  together with its conditionality,  can also
have pervasive effects,  especially at the household level;
(c)  The smaller the worker's potential contribution  to total household income, the
more important the opportunity cost of working and the weaker the incentives
for job search  and further employment.  This  mechanism is specially relevant
in the case of secondary  earners;
(d)  Disincentive  effects  are  aggravated  by  the  presence  of children  and  the
payment of child (or parental)  allowances,  since these bring  the replacement
ratio of actual income to potential  income closer to one, or even above one in
the case of families with low levels of education/low income;  and
(e)  Finally,  all this  implies that  it is possible  for certain  households  to be worse
off when both adults are employed than when only one of them is because the
potential net contribution to total household income of the secondary  earner is
very small, or even negative.
1452.  As  we  pointed  out  above,  we  will  consider  these  mechanisms  as  a  guide  for  the
empirical  analysis.  The  next  couple  of  sections  explain  how  the  transition  from  these
hypothetical  examples to the real  data will work, and what are the different strategies that we
have  in mind in order to test the 'predictions'  generated by such examples.
E.  DATA
53.  The  empirical  analysis  combines  two  different  data  sources,  the  Unemployment
Registry  (National  Labor  Office)  and the  Labor  Force  Survey  (Slovak  Statistical  Office).
The  first  data  source  contains  very  detailed  information  on  unemployment  duration  and
unemployment  insurance  payments  and will therefore  be used to assess the  effect that such
payments  may have  on  the  behavior  of unemployed  workers.  However,  there  are  certain
drawbacks associated  with the use of these data.  First, a registered worker is not necessarily
an unemployed  worker according  to ILO standards (i.e.  did not perform  paid work for more
than an hour during the week  prior to the  interview,  is  looking for  a job,  and is able to start
working  within  the  next  two  weeks),  and  it  is  impossible  to  determine  who  is  actually
'unemployed'  using  such  criteria  because  no  information  is  collected  neither  on  search
behavior nor on availability.  Second,  the  Unemployment Registry  contains no  information
on  social  assistance/support  payments  or  on  household-level  variables,  although both  are
potentially  very  relevant  for  out  analysis.  Fortunately,  the  Labor  Force  Survey  provides
fairly rich  information on both issues,  so  we  will  this data both  to expand  the  scope of the
analysis,  and  to  check  on  the  robustness  of  the  results  obtained  when  using  the
Unemployment Registry.
Unemployment  Registry data
54.  We use administrative  data from the Unemployment  Registry covering all districts in
the Slovak Republic  for 1990-2000.  These data contain information on the beginning and the
ending  dates  of  the  unemployment  spell,  as  well  as  on  the  quantity  and  duration  of
unemployment  insurance  benefits  when  received.  Since  information  is  organized  by
individual  rather than by spell,  the  records  only contain  complete  demographic  information
on the  last unemployment  spell  of each  unemployed  individual.  However,  we  are  able  to
construct individual histories  using archival data on past unemployment  spells, and adjusting
the necessary demographic variables accordingly.
55.  The sample contains 30,714  spells corresponding  to  18,141  individuals.  The number
of spells per individual  ranges  from  1 to 5, although  more than 50 percent of all  individuals
in the  sample  experience  only  one unemployment  spell (Table  VI).  The  duration  of such
spells  also  varies  substantially,  with  36  percent  lasting  less  than  3 months  and  25  percent
lasting for more than a year (Table  VII).
56.  Individuals in the sample are fairly young, with 60 percent (35  percent) of them under
35  (25) at the beginning of the corresponding  spell" 4 (Table VIII).  As a consequence,  almost
a third of the sample has no previous  work experience.  Almost half of the workers possess
14  All  summary  statistics  are  reported  at  the  beginning  of the  corresponding  unemployment  spell.  Gender,
marital  status  and  education  do  not  vary  across  spells  for  the  same  individual,  while  age,  region  and  work
experience  (or the lack of) do.
15an  apprenticeship  degree,  while  an  extra  30  percent  has  secondary  studies.  Finally,  the
incidence  of unemployment  is  lowest  in  Bratislava  and  highest in  Kosice,  as  can be  seen
from their share of all spells, 5 percent and 20 percent respectively.
57.  The average  spell  duration is  10.42  months,  and almost 60  percent of all  spells  end
with  a  transition  into  private-sector  employment.  Also,  44  percent  of  all  observations
correspond to spells during which the individual  received unemployment  insurance benefits.
It  is important  to distinguish  this number  from  the  percentage  of unemployed  individuals
that, at a certain point in time,  are receiving unemployment insurance.  As was mentioned in
Section C, this number is much smaller, about 25-30 percent since 1995.
58.  There are some demographic  differences  between unemployment insurance recipients
and non-recipients.  In particular,  there is a higher fraction of married,  prime-aged, and mid-
level education workers among the former.  This group also exhibits a higher rate of previous
employment  experience,  and,  as  we  pointed  out  above,  longer  unemployment  spells.
However,  they  also  have  higher  exit-to-employment  rates:  65 percent,  compared  to  55
percent for non-recipients.
Labor Force Survey
59.  We also use data from the Labor Force Survey,  administered by the Slovak Statistical
Office  on a  quarterly  basis  since  1994.  In particular,  we use  data  for  the years  1996  and
1999,  together with the first two quarters  of 2000.  In each quarter,  the Labor Force  Survey
sample  contains  approximately  10,000  households  (about  0.1  percent  of  all  Slovak
households), or 30,000 individuals.  The survey follows a 20 percent rotation scheme  across
every two consecutive  quarters, which  implies that we can trace individuals  for a maximum
of five quarters.
60.  The fact that individuals are only observed for a limited period of time, together with
the absence of retrospective  questions in the  survey, implies  that, in order to obtain accurate
information  on benefit entitlement  and recipiency,  we need to impose  additional  conditions
when  constructing  the sub-sample  we will  work with.  In  particular,  we select  only  those
individuals  who  (i)  become  unemployed  during the  survey  period  or who  (ii) have  been
unemployed  for less than three months at the time of the first interview.  This way we follow
individuals from the beginning of their unemployment spells and can correctly identify their
recipiency  status.  This selection rule has the added advantage  of allowing us to avoid stock
sampling bias (i.e. over-representation  of long spells).
61.  The  sample  then  contains  2,465  unemployed  individuals,  where  the  definition  of
unemployment  accords with ILO standards.  We observe a single spell per individual, which
can  be completed  or censored,  given that individuals  remain  in the  sample  for at most  five
quarters.  Almost  50 percent  of all  (observed)  spells  last for less than  three  months,  while
about 4 percent last for more  than a year  (Table IX).  This  distribution differs  substantially
from the  one presented  on  Table VII,  in that the share of short (long)  spells is much larger
(smaller)  in  the  Labor  Force  Survey than  in the  Unemployment  Registry  sample.  This  is
primarily due to the sampling methodology  used for the Labor Force Survey:  since  we only
select those individuals that just became unemployed or that have been unemployed  for a few
months,  and  since  we  only  observe  these  individuals  for  a  limited  period  of time,  their
16observed  spells  will  be  shorter  than  the  average  spell,  and  long  spells  will  be  under-
represented  in the sample.
62.  Summary  statistics are presented  in Table  XIII.  The sample  appears  to be  younger
than  the  one  drawn  from  the  Unemployment  Registry,  with  almost  70  percent  of all
individuals under  the  age of 35  at the beginning  of the  corresponding  spell.  However,  the
higher fraction of young workers is partly a consequence  of the exclusion from the sample of
all  individuals  above  55  due to their small  number.  The  share of workers with no previous
labor  market  experience  is  again  around  30  percent,  and  the  regional  distribution  of the
unemployed  is  also  close  to  that  described  for  the  Unemployment  Registry.  The  large
majority of the workers  possesses  either an apprenticeship  degree  (40 percent)  or secondary
studies (40 percent).  These  numbers imply that both  samples  are fairly  similar  in terms of
the demographic  characteristics  of the unemployed and their spatial distribution,  despite  the
differences  in the sampling methodology.
63.  Household  heads  represent  20  percent  of the  sample,  compared  to  17  percent  for
spouses  and  61  percent  for  other household members  (mainly  children living with parents).
The  average  household  size  is  4.4  individuals,  and the  dependency  ratio  (i.e. fraction  of
household members below  15 or above 65 years of age) is about 20 percent.
64.  Approximately  53 percent of all  individuals are paid unemployment  insurance  during
the unemployment  spell,  while 31  percent  receive  social  assistance/support.  There  is some
overlapping  between  both  programs,  with  18  percent  of those  receiving  unemployment
insurance,  also  getting social  assistance/support.  Moreover,  10  percent  (18  percent)  of the
unemployed live in households where some other member receives unemployment  insurance
(social  assistance/support).  Finally,  about  90  percent  of the  sample  is  registered  at  the
Employment  Office,  almost half of it declares  to be  searching  actively  for a job  (i.e.  using
search  channels  other  than  registration  at  the  Employment  Office),  and  15  percent  finds
employment during the survey period.  Notice,  however, that this figure  is an underestimate
of the percentage  of workers who eventually  find a job, since we do not observe workers for
the totality of their spell."5
65.  Benefit  recipients  are  again  slightly  different,  in  demographic  terms,  from  non-
recipients.  As in the Unemployment  Registry  sample,  the fraction of married,  prime-aged,
mid-level  education  workers  is  higher  among  recipients.  Also,  unemployment  spells  are
longer  for recipients  and,  contrary  to the  Unemployment  Registry  data,  they  exhibit  lower
exit-to-employment  rates than their counterparts.  With respect to household  level variables,
household heads tend to be over-represented  in this group, while spouses of heads are under-
represented.  Unemployment rates are higher for those household where there are recipients,
which is not surprising since social assistance/support/SS  are means-tested programs  and we
would expect income to be lower in households where unemployment rates are high.
15 In fact, this will be very important when we interpret the results on the effect of benefits  on exit-to-
employment.
17F.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND  SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
66.  The purpose of this  section is twofold.  First, we intent to provide  a rough road map
for the empirical strategy implemented in the paper, leaving the presentation of the details for
the next section.  Second,  and most important, we discuss some methodological  issues that
we  consider  key  in  interpreting  the results,  and  highlight  what we  believe  are  the main
contributions of this work.
A guide to the empirical strategy
67.  For the  sake of clarity and internal  logic of the presentation,  we have  structured  the
analytical  work  around  three  building  blocks,  namely,  the  effects  of  benefits  on
(i) unemployment  duration,  (ii)  on  exit-to-(private  sector)  employment,  and  (iii)  on job
search and match quality.  The evidence  presented in first block relies on survival analysis," 6
while  the  second  and  third  blocks  uses  probability  models.'7 We  also  provide  summary
statistics  and  tabulations  to  motivate  and  complement  the  regression  results  in  all  three
blocks.
68.  Survival  models  are commonly used to  determine which  variables  have an effect  on
the duration of a certain event.  In our case,  this event is unemployment.  Thus, (observed)
unemployment  duration,  expressed in some  measure  of time  (e.g. months),  is the left-hand
variable  in the model, the variable we are trying to explain.  Then, on the right hand side, we
would  like to include all those factors that we believe may have an effect on unemployment
duration,  such as the demographic  characteristics  of the individual  or information on his/her
recipiency status.
69.  Similarly, probability models are used to study the determinants of the likelihood of a
certain event or behavior.  For instance, here we will use this type of models to determine
what factors affect the probability that an individual  finds a job in the private sector,  or the
probability that a worker looks  actively for  a job while unemployed.  A peculiar  feature of
these  models  is that,  while  we  directly  observe  from the  data whether  something  actually
happens  or  not  (e.g.  the  worker  find  a  job),  the  model  will  only  produce  a  predicted
probability  that  such  event  occurs.  That  is,  the  model  will  tell us how  likely  it is that  a
certain individual will find a job, given his characteristics,  rather than whether the individual
actually finds ajob or not.  In terms of the data, this implies that the left-hand side variable is
an  indicator that takes  a value  of one if we  observe the event  or behavior we are trying to
explain,  and a value of zero  otherwise,  while the outcome produced by the model will be a
number  between  zero  and one  (and, most  likely,  different  from zero  and  one),  a predicted
probability.  The right-hand  side of the  model will  again  include  all those  factors that  we
believe to have an effect on the event we are trying to explain.
16  We estimate a Weibull model, in proportional hazard form.
''  We  estimate  a probit  model  for  (i)  the probability of exit-to-employment,  and  (ii) the  probability of job
(active) search.
1870.  Finally,  since  the  contents  of the  Unemployment  Registry  and  the  Labor  Force
Survey are somehow different, we use either  source depending  on its comparative  advantage
in  addressing  the  question  at  hand.  The  table  below  summarizes  the  empirical  strategy,
together with the information on each dataset discussed in the previous section:
Unemployment Registry  Labor Force Survey
Comments  ADVANTAGES  ADVANTAGES
- Completed unemp spells  - Information  on social
- Very detailed information  assistance/support
on unemployment insurance  - Information available at the
benefits.  individual and household
levels
DISADVANTAGES  DISADVANTAGES
- No information on social  - Limited information on
assistance/support  unemployment
- Information available only  insurance/social
at the individual level  assistance/support
- Individuals  observed for a
limited period of time
(censored unemp spells)
MAIN USE  MAIN USE
- Analysis of unemployment  - Analysis of social
insurance  assistance/support
- Analysis of household factors
Unemployment  duration  Survival model (unemp spell)  Survival model (unemp spell)
Exit-to-employment  Probability model (exit)  Probability model (exit)
Job  search  and  match  Probability model (search)
quality
Some methodological  comments
71.  Given  the  relative  complexity  of the  safety  net  system,  we  expect  tremendous
variation  to exist  both  between  and within  individual  experiences.  For  this  reason,  it  is
necessary  to  take  into  account  not  only  for benefit  recipiency,  but also  differences  in  the
type/quantity  of  the  benefits  received.  For  instance,  once  an  individual  becomes
unemployed, she may or may not qualify for unemployment  insurance benefits.  If indeed she
is entitled,  the duration of such benefits  would be a function, among other factors, of the her
contributive history.  Although,  in a regression  context,  the use  of an indicator  variable  for
recipiency  would  get  at the  issue  of entitlement,  it would not be very  useful  at identifying
behavioral differences between recipients with dissimilar contributive histories.
72.  Similarly,  the experience  of any given recipient also  varies over time due to the two-
tier nature of the unemployment insurance  system, and to the limited duration of the benefits.
For example,  a worker who is entitled to five moths of unemployment insurance  benefits and
who remains unemployed  for ten months, will receive high-level  benefits (high replacement
ratio)  for  three  months,  low-level  benefits  (low  replacement  ratio)  for  an  additional  two-
19month period, and finally no payments  at all  for the rest of the spell.  There  is no reason to
believe that the behavior of this worker will remain unchanged during the ten months that she
is unemployed,  so  we  distinguish  between  these  three  different  scenarios  in  the  empirical
analysis.  In order  to  do this,  we  transform  the  original  Unemployment  Registry  data  by
dividing each unemployment  spell in what we called (shorter) pseudo-spells  that account for
changes in the worker's unemployment  insurance status.
73.  This methodology  is best understood  through  an example.  The first part of the table
below  contains  benefit  information  for  three  different  individuals,  as  it  appears  in  the
Unemployment  Registry.  All three  individuals become unemployed  at the same time (t=l),
but  their  spells  differ  in  length.  Moreover,  the  first  individual  does  not  receive
unemployment  insurance,  while the other two do.  Finally,  individuals  1 and 2  find a job in
the private sector, but individual 3 does not.
Original data.
ID  Entry  Exit  Received  Duration  Duration  Duration  Exit-to-
UI  U  I  high RR'  low  RRtA  emp
1  1  12  No  - - - Yes
2  1  14  Yes  6  3  3  Yes
3  1  5  Yes  2  2  0  No
Auxiliary data.
ID  Entry  Exit  Receiving  Receiving  Receiving  Exhausted  Exit-to-
UT  high RRA  IOW RRA  U  emp
1  1  12  No  No  Yes
2  1  3  Yes  Yes  No  No  No
2  3  6  Yes  No  Yes  No  No
2  6  14  No  Yes  Yes
3  1  2  Yes  Yes  No  No  No
3  2  5  No  Yes  No
Replacement ratio.
74.  The lower part of the table shows this data in a new format.  Individual l's record is
identical  to  the previous  one  since she  does  not experience  any  changes  in  unemployment
insurance  status  during  her  time  unemployed  (i.e.  she  never  receives  unemployment
insurance).  In contrast,  individual  2's history  is now captured  through three pseudo-spells.
The first one  corresponds to the period when the worker receives  high-level  unemployment
insurance,  between months  1 and 3.  Similarly,  the second and third ones correspond to low-
level  unemployment  insurance  and no unemployment  insurance  respectively.  Because  the
individual  finds  a job  only  after  14  months,  'No'  is  recorded  in  the  exit-to-employment
column  in the first  and second  pseudo-spells.  Finally,  changes  for the third individual  are
made following the same criteria.
75.  Although,  in  principle,  the  social  assistance/support  system  is  as  complex  as  the
unemployment  insurance  one, some  of its  features  facilitate  the  analysis  substantially.  In
particular,  the  fact the  amount of the  payments  is either fixed  (i.e.  maternity  allowance  or
child allowance)  or designed  to bring household  income to the MSL  level,  eliminates much
20of the variation  in benefit quantities.  Similarly,  benefit duration is no longer  an issue,  since
in most cases there is no time limit on social assistance/support recipiency.  Hence, in dealing
with  social  assistance/support  benefits  we  consider  the  use of an  indicator  variable  to  be
sufficient,  although we also include benefit duration in some of the regressions."8
G.  RESULTS
Unemployment  insurance, social  assistance  and unemployment duration
76.  We  start  the  analysis  by  studying the  relationship  between  different  features  of the
unemployment  insurance  system and unemployment  duration.  In particular,  we pay special
attention to the duration of the benefits and to changes in the benefit quantity associated with
the two-tier  nature  of the unemployment  insurance  system - i.e. high and  low replacement
ratios.
77.  As a first pass, Table X presents separate unemployment  spell  distributions for those
individuals  who  receive  unemployment  insurance  and  those  who  do  not,  using  the
Unemployment  Registry.  It can be seen that those with no unemployment  insurance exit the
Registry  sooner  than  those  with  it:  almost  50  percent  of all  spells  with no  unemployment
insurance  last  less  than  three  months,  while  this  number  is  21  percent  for  spells  with
unemployment  insurance.  Interestingly,  this  difference  tends  to  disappear  as  we  move
towards  longer  spells.  Given  that  benefit  duration  is  limited,  such  pattern  would  be
consistent  with the  existence  of disincentive  effects  associated  with recipiency.  To explore
this issue further,  we explicitly account for the  duration of benefits (Table XI), and  find that
those  who  receive unemployment  insurance  actually  leave the Registry  when  or soon after
their benefits come to an end.
78.  However,  we need  to  be cautious  in  interpreting  this  evidence  in  a  causal  manner.
We observe  the  duration  of the  benefits  actually  received  by the  individual,  rather than the
duration of the  benefits he was potentially  entitled to.  This implies that when the  observed
duration of the  benefits  is  equal  to the  duration  of the spell,  we  cannot distinguish  a priori
between  the  following  two  scenarios:  (i)  the  worker  exits  the  Registry  because
unemployment  insurance  benefits  are  exhausted,  or  (ii) observed benefits  end because  the
unemployment  spell finishes,  even though the individual was  still entitled to unemployment
insurance.1 9 Yet, given  that the average  duration of benefits  in the  sample is 4.5  months, it
seems  reasonable  to  assume that  the  first story  is  more likely  to  apply in  the  case of long
spells, whereas the second one best describes the experience of those with shorter spells.
79.  In addition, part of the differences  between recipients  and non-recipients,  in terms of
unemployment  duration,  could  be  a  product  of the  different  demographic  composition  of
both groups of workers.  For instance,  women may be less attached  to the labor market than
men,  and therefore  have  a  higher  probability  of exiting  the  Registry  at any  point  in time,
18  Some workers do seem to move in and out of the SA/SS system over time.  This could be due to a change  in
individual or family circumstances that affects the household eligibility for benefits.
19  This problem  arises more frequently  in the case of short spells.  For instance,  84 percent of those with  two-
month  long  unemployment  spells receive  Ul  for the  full  two  months.  This  number  decreases  to  48  and 8
percent for six and nine-month long spells respectively.
21independent of their recipiency  status.  Since the fraction of female workers  is higher among
non-recipients,  this could lead to a larger share of shorter spells among non-recipients that is
unrelated to benefit entitlement.
80.  These  issues motivate the use of regression  analysis, so as to  separate the effect that
unemployment  insurance  recipiency  may have  on unemployment  duration  from the  effects
associated  with  other  variables  such  as  gender.  As  we  discussed  in  Section  F,  we  use  a
proportional hazard  model for this purpose.20 The estimation results  are presented  on Table
XII  as  hazard  ratios.  This  means  that  a number  smaller  than  1 for variable  X  must  be
interpreted  as  X  having  a 'positive'  effect  on unemployment  duration  (i.e. unemployment
duration increases as X takes higher values),  and a number larger than  1 must be interpreted
as  X  having  a  'negative'  effect  on  unemployment  duration  (i.e.  unemployment  duration
decreases  as X takes higher values).2'  Also it is important to remember  that all coefficients
must be understood  with respect to the comparison  (or omitted)  group.  For instance,  if we
are  considering  five  different  education  levels  (no  studies,  primary,  apprenticeship,
secondary,  and college or more), and the comparison group is 'workers with no studies', then
a  coefficient  of,  say,  1.12  associated  with  'secondary  education'  must  be  interpreted  as
'workers with a  secondary  education  experience  shorter unemployment  spells than workers
with no studies'.
81.  We first present a baseline model containing  all the demographic  variables  and none
of the benefit-related  information.  The purpose of this model is to provide  a benchmark that
allows  us  to  evaluate  the  relative  importance  of demographic  differences  in  explaining
unemployment  duration, once we control  for unemployment insurance  recipiency.  Then,  as
can  be  seen  under  'Baseline',  women experience  longer spells  than  men,  and  so  do  single
workers.  Those between  26 and 45  years of age spend less time unemployed than younger
workers  (under  25),  while  those  above  46  spend  more.  Duration  also  decreases  with
education,  and those with no previous  employment  experience  are actually  faster to exit the
Registry.  These  effects  are  fairly  robust  to different  specifications,  in  the  sense  that  the
coefficients do not vary much when other variables are included,  hence we will concentrate
mainly on the benefit-related variables when commenting on the rest of the models.
82.  The next two columns  contain the results  for models that include either an indicator
for whether the individual ever received unemployment insurance during that particular spell,
or a  measure  of the duration  of such benefits.  From the  first model,  it  seems  that benefit
recipiency  increases  unemployment  duration.  In  particular,  those  who  receive
unemployment  insurance  experience  spells that are,  on average,  30 percent  longer than  the
ones of individuals without unemployment  insurance.  If we instead control for the duration
of unemployment  insurance,  each extra month of benefits  increases duration by 15 percent.
83.  However,  the quantity of the benefits varies over time, as the worker moves from the
high-replacement-ratio  regime to the low-replacement-ratio  one.  Since  there is no reason to
expect that the effect  on unemployment  duration  of an  extra  month of high  benefits  is the
same as that of an extra month of low benefits, the coefficient  on benefit duration above  is an
20  We estimate a Weibull model.  For a more detailed  discussion on hazard models, the reader can consult Lee
(1992) or Greene (2??).
21  In the case of indicator variables, X can only take two values, 0 or 1,  but the same reasoning applies.
22average  rather than the  true  effect of either high  or  low benefits.  Then,  in  order to  capture
any  potential  differences  across  regimes, we include  two  different  variables  the duration  of
high  and  low  replacement  periods  (column  I1l).  Surprisingly,  the  coefficients  of  both
variables are very similar in size; that is, one extra month of high replacement unemployment
insurance  has  the  same  effect  on  unemployment  duration  as  one  more  month  of  low
replacement unemployment insurance  (namely, a 15 percent increase  in duration).
84.  Yet these results are subject to an important criticism: they do not capture behavioral
differences  associated  with actually receiving  or not receiving  unemployment insurance,  but
rather differences  associated with ever receiving or never receiving unemployment  insurance.
This second comparison  is not fully satisfactory since, once unemployment  insurance  is over,
those who  were entitled to benefits  find themselves  in the  same situation as those who never
received  them.  To address this issue, we  follow the procedure  described  above and create a
series of pseudo spells  so that the indicators  for unemployment  insurance recipiency,  and for
high/low replacement ratios are allowed to vary over time - i.e. to be turned on and off, so to
speak, as individuals move across the different regimes.
85.  These new results not only strengthen our previous conclusions, but also provide new
evidence  on  how  the  behavior  of those  who  receive  unemployment  insurance  varies  over
time  (columns  IV  and  V).  The  effect  of  unemployment  insurance  recipiency  on
unemployment  duration  is  even  more  evident  than  before,  with  those  who  are  actually
receiving  the  benefits  spending  almost  50  percent  more  time  unemployed  than  those  who
never received  any  payments.  More  interestingly,  because  this  methodology  allows  us  to
capture changes in the behavior of unemployment  insurance  recipients,  we  can now see that,
once unemployment  insurance  is over,  those  entitled  to unemployment  insurance  leave  the
Registry at much faster rate than those who never received any benefits.  This result confirms
the basic intuition arising from Table XI and discussed above.
86.  In  addition,  there  is  now  a  clear  difference  between  those  who  receive  high
replacement  unemployment  insurance  and  those  who  receive  low  replacement
unemployment  insurance,  with  the  former  exhibiting  lower  exit probabilities  (and,  hence,
longer unemployment  duration).  In particular,  while unemployment  duration  is  almost  50
percent  longer  for those  receiving  high level  benefits  than  for those  with  no benefits,  this
percentage  falls to 25 percent when the quantity of the benefits decreases.  Furthermore,  once
unemployment  insurance  payments  end,  those  entitled tend to  exit the Registry  at  a higher
rate than those who have not.
87.  We  already  mentioned  in  Section  E  that  not  all  individuals  in  the  Unemployment
Registry can be considered unemployed  according to ILO standards.  In fact, it is very likely
that some of them are  only registered for the purpose  of receiving unemployment  insurance
and/or social  assistance/support,  and never had the  intention of actually  looking  for a job  or
becoming  employed.  These  individuals would  be ready to abandon  the Registry  once their
benefits  are  over,  and if they represent  a large  share  of the sample,  their behavior  may be
driving some of our results.  In order to check for this, we re-estimate the  models  described
above using the Labor Force Survey, and including  in the sample  only those workers who are
truly unemployed (i.e. searching  for a job and available to start work).
2388.  The  results  for  unemployment  insurance  recipiency  are  almost  identical,  both
qualitatively  and quantitatively,  to the ones obtained with the Unemployment Registry data,
the only exception being that the coefficient  for past recipiency is now smaller than one and
insignificant  (Table XIII).  This probably responds to the fact that spells are much shorter in
this sample,  and therefore  there are  fewer  individuals  with a long  enough history to reflect
such changes  (i.e. the standard errors associated with this coefficient are large).
89.  In contrast, the demographic results differ somewhat from the ones obtained with the
Unemployment  Registry.  Gender  and  marital  status  are  not  significant  determinants  of
unemployment  duration  in  this  sample,  while  education  still  appears  to  be  negatively
correlated  with it.  The effect  of previous  experience  is also  reversed,  which  is most likely
due to  the  fact  that  'lack of experience'  was  an  imputed  variable  in  the  Unemployment
Registry  but a recorded,  and thus more accurate  variable  here.22 Checking  for robustness,
however, is not the only advantage associated with using the Labor Force Survey.  This data
also  provides  information  on  social  assistance/support  payments  and  on  household-level
variables,  such as the number of young  children  in the  family,  which may  have  important
effects on unemployment duration and are not included in the Unemployment Registry.
90.  Interestingly,  social  assistance/support  seems  to  have  the  same  effects  as
unemployment  insurance,  only more pronounced:  social assistance/support  recipients  spend
almost  50 percent  more time  unemployed than  non-recipients.  This appears  to be  entirely
due entirely to the fact that social assistance/support  duration is unlimited, since the marginal
effect  associated  with an extra  month of benefits  is almost equal  for both programs.  With
respect  to household-level  variables,  only the  individual's  position  in  the family  seems  to
have  explanatory  power,  with  household  heads  and  their  spouses  spending  more  time
unemployed than other members of the household  (although this result is only significant for
the latter).
91.  In  sum,  in  this  section  we have  learnt  that  (i)  both  unemployment  insurance  and
social  assistance/support  recipiency  increase  unemployment  duration,  and  that  (ii)  the
behavior of those  individuals  who  are  entitled  to  benefits  varies  over  time,  depending  on
whether they are actually receiving the payments or they did so in the past.  In particular, exit
rates for this group  increase  substantially after their benefits  are over.  This is an issue that
deserves  further  attention,  but  before  we  look  into  it  in  more  detail  we  would  like  to
illustrate,  through graphical analysis,  the magnitude  of the  effects we have been discussing.
For this purpose,  we have  simulated  distributions  of predicted  unemployment  spells under
different  hypothetical  scenarios,  using the  models  described  above  and the Unemployment
Registry.  Such  distributions  are  then  compared  in  ways  that  help  us understand  the  role
played  by the different  features of the  unemployment  insurance  system  (i.e.  eligibility and
coverage, duration of benefits, replacement ratio).
22  When  using  the  UR,  the variable  'No  previous  employment  experience'  is  constructed  based  only  on
employment  data for 1990-2000,  while the LFS  questionnaire  directly  asks people  whether they have worked
before.
24What it all means, at a glance
92.  We start by  comparing  the  actual  distribution  of spells, with those  that would  have
arose  had  everybody23/nobody  received  unemployment  insurance.  Not  surprisingly,
increases  in  the  coverage  rate  (i.e.  share  of workers  entitled  to  unemployment  insurance
benefits)  cause  average  unemployment  duration  to  increase.24 Graphically,  this translates
into a rightward shift of the spell distribution.  For instance, while  18 percent of all spells last
less than three months given the actual allocation of benefits, this number increases to about
24 percent  when no benefits  are distributed (i.e.  more workers leave  the Registry early on),
and  decreases  to  almost  0  when  everybody  is  entitled  to twelve  months of unemployment
insurance  (i.e.  almost  no  workers  leave  the  Registry  during  the  first  three  months  of
unemployment).  The same patterns arise for longer spells.
Graph I
Distribution of (pordlct.d)  fnen,ployrnent.p.11a  41)
400  SMU
Source: Unemployment Registry
93.  Similarly,  we  explore  the  role  of (maximum)  benefit  duration  by  comparing  the
distribution  of predicted  spells corresponding  to  systems  with  a maximum  unemployment
insurance  duration of 3,  6,  9 or  12 months.  Again more generous unemployment  insurance
benefits, this time in terms of duration,  shift the distribution of spells to the right.
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23  We apply  1999 rules  and provide the maximum Ul.
24  It  is  important  to keep  in  mind  that  the  role  of this  exercise  is  simply  illustrative,  and  it should  not  be
understood as a policy recommendation  in itself
2594.  Finally,  we  compare  the  actual  distribution  of  spells  with  that  generated  by
substituting high replacement unemployment insurance with low replacement  unemployment
insurance.  That is, actual recipients  are still  entitled to the same number of unemployment
insurance  payments  (in  months),  but they  only receive  low-replacement  benefits,  and non-
recipients remain  so.  The effects are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained in the previous
examples:  exit rates  increase when we reduce the amount of the benefits (i.e.  its generosity)
and the distribution of spells shifts leftwards.
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Exit-to-employment.
95.  As  we  mentioned  above,  there  is  substantial  variation  in  the  behavior  of
unemployment  insurance  recipients  over time.  In  particular,  although  their unemployment
spells  are  longer  on  average  than  those  of  non-recipients,  they  tend  to  abandon  the
Unemployment Registry  faster than their counterparts  once the  benefits  are exhausted.  The
question then arises as to what it means to leave the Registry,  since exit does not necessarily
imply employment.  For instance,  it could be the case that, once unemployment  insurance  is
exhausted,  workers  have  no further reason  to  remain  registered.  The  policy  implications
associated with each scenario are fairly different, so we explore this issue further.
96.  Using the Unemployment  Registry,  we estimate a probit model for the probability of
exit-to-employment,25 where  employment  means  private  sector  work.  As before,  we  first
provide the baseline results, when no benefit-related variables  are included in the regression
(Table XIV).  Women  and married  workers  have  a slightly higher probability  of finding  a
job, and so do prime-aged and/or more educated  individuals.  These effects are fairly robust
to different model specifications.
97.  When we consider benefit entitlement,  workers who receive unemployment insurance
are  more  likely to  find  a job  in  the  private  sector  than those  who  do not  (about  a  nine
25  Only  exit  to  employment  in  the  private  sector  was  considered  as  a  successful  exit.  Qualitatively  and
quantitatively  equivalent  results  are  obtained  when  exit  to  both  employment  in  the  private  sector  and
employment in a public employment program are considered instead.
26percentage-point  increase  in probability).  There  also  seems  to  be  some  stigma  associated
with  longer  spells,  which  could  potentially  hurt  recipients  since  they  spend  more  time
unemployed  on  average,  but  this  effect  is  very  small  compared  to  the  unemployment
insurance one (a one percentage-point  decrease in probability for every tow extra months).
98.  As we did when analyzing  unemployment duration, we want to differentiate  between
'currently  receiving  unemployment  insurance'  and  'having  ever  received  unemployment
insurance'  to allow  for potential  behavioral  differences  related to changes  in the  recipiency
regime.  Once we do so, we  find that the probability  of exit-to-employment  for recipients  is
actually very low while receiving unemployment  insurance, and that it increases substantially
once the benefits are over.  In particular, workers  who are currently receiving unemployment
insurance are 40 percent less likely than non-recipients to move to a private sector job, while
those who have exhausted their benefits are 35 percent more likely to do so.  Similarly, when
we distinguish between  high and low replacement  unemployment  insurance,  it appears  that
the probability  of finding a job in the private-sector  is smallest while the worker is receiving
the  former.  In  sum,  workers  who  are  receiving  benefits  are  the  least  likely  to  exit-to-
employment,  and workers whose benefits have ended are the most likely to do so.
99.  The negative  effect of unemployment duration remains  in both models,  but it is still
very small, about a one percentage-point  decrease per month of unemployment.  Given that,
on  average,  recipients  spend  2extra  months  unemployed,  compared  to  non-recipients,  the
effect  of  duration  is  far  from  compensating  the  effect  of  recipiency  (of exhaustion  of
recipiency,  to be more precise).
100.  When we repeat this exercise using the Labor Force Survey, we obtain results that are
qualitative similar but insignificant in most cases (Table 4 in Data Appendix).  The effects of
both  unemployment  insurance  and  social  assistance/support  present  the  signs  discussed
above, but they are too small to be significantly  different from zero.  Only the negative effect
of unemployment duration is robust to the data change, together with those effects  associated
with  education  and  the  lack  of previous  employment  experience.  It  is,  however,  not
surprising  that the evidence  from  the Labor Force Survey  is weak.  Given the design of the
survey  and our sampling  strategy,  individuals are  observed  for short periods  of time  at the
beginning of their spells, which implies that most unemployment spells are censored.  Hence,
a substantial fraction of those that appear in the sample as 'not having found a job', should be
viewed  as 'not having found a job yet'  instead,  since they will probably  do so in the  future.
For this reason, we find the Unemployment Registry results, based on completed spells, more
reliable and therefore  continue with the analysis under the assumption that benefit recipients
seem to find private employment more often than non-recipients.
Job search and job/match quality
101.  In  principle,  there  is  no  single  explanation  for  the  link  between  unemployment
insurance  recipiency  and  a higher  likelihood of exit-to-employment.  One  can  think of the
probability  of exit-to-employment  as a  function  of the  number  of job offers  that  a  worker
receives,  which  in  time  depends  on  the  individual's  search  effort,  and  his  willingness  to
accept any given offer.  Then, it may be the case that unemployment  insurance  payments, by
lowering  the  opportunity  cost  of unemployment,  allow these  workers  to  search more  (and
27more  selectively),  and  to  therefore  find  a  match  more  often.  Besides,  since  the  search
process is time-consuming,  these workers also experience  longer unemployment spells.
102.  On the other hand,  it is possible that receiving benefits  increases workers'  reservation
wages, making them less willing to accept job offers, and hence decreasing  their probability
of exit (i.e.  increasing  unemployment  duration).  We  believe  it is important  to distinguish
between these two hypotheses,  and we attempt to do  so here using the Labor Force  Survey.
But before we get into the nuts and bolts of the exercise, there are two issues concerning the
data that require attention.
103.  Both the  unemployment  insurance  and the social  assistance/support  systems  require
that workers  be registered  at the Employment  Office  (i.e. Unemployment  Registry) in order
to  qualify  for benefit payments.  This  implies that  all recipients  will  be registered,  and, if
registration  is  considered  a  search  channel,  looking  for  a job,  eliminating  all  potential
variation  in the data.  Second,  by construction  all unemployed workers are  looking for a job,
hence we cannot restrict the analysis to the unemployed  only.
104.  In dealing with the first issue, we consider an alternative, more restrictive  definition
of 'search', namely 'active search'.  A worker is said to be actively searching for a job, if she
is  making  use  of  search  channels  other  than  the  Employment  Office  (e.g. private  job
agencies,  placing/reading  advertisements,  etc.).  When we  correlate  this new variable  with
unemployment  insurance  recipiency,  we  find that  workers  entitled  to benefits  seem  to  be
more  active  in  their  search  than  those  who  are  not,  but  also  that  their  behavior  varies
substantially  depending  on  whether  they  are  actually  receiving  the  benefits  or not (Table
XV).  In particular,  40  percent  of those  receiving  unemployment  insurance  are  searching
actively,  while only 32 percent  of those with no benefits  and 60 percent of those who  have
exhausted  the benefits are doing so.  The group  least likely to search actively is that of non-
registered workers.
105.  In order to avoid the second problem, we use the sampling  methodology discussed in
the data section and select a new sample that includes all those individuals who  (i) become
non-employed  during  the  survey  period or who  (ii)  had  been  non-employed  for less than
three months at the time of the first interview.  Notice that this sample can be considered  an
extension  of our  original  sample  of unemployed  workers,26 and  that the  information  on
unemployment  insurance  and  social  assistance/support  obtained  using  this  methodology  is
still accurate.  A total of 2,494 workers are then selected, two thirds of them are unemployed
and  the  remaining  30  percent  is  out of the  labor  force  (Table  XVI).  Approximately  65
percent  of the observations  in the sample  correspond to workers looking for a job, although
less than half of them does so 'actively'.  In addition, about 45 percent of the sample receives
unemployment insurance, and  13 percent receives social assistance/support.
26  Strictly  speaking  this new sample  does not contain all workers  included  in the  original sample because we
require that the worker was employed before,  whereas in the previous  case  we only required  that she was not
unemployed (this would include  'out of the labor force',  as well as 'employed').  This explains why the sample
size does not increase substantially when we select the new sample.
28Box  1.  Educational Levels,  Unemployment  and Re-Employment.
We have  already  pointed  out that unemployment  is  highest  among those  with  low  educational  levels,  and
lowest among college graduates.  In addition,  the  number of unemployed  workers per vacancy  is much  larger for those
with  low education  than  for  workers  with  secondary  or  college  studies.  Such  imbalances  are  the product of a skill
mismatch  between labor supply and  labor demand.
Table  B1.I  Number of unemployed workers per v  cancy,  by ed  cation groups.
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Total  50  28  22  23  18  39
None  152  73  77  162  28  80
Basic  146  137  120  95  51  131
Apprent. low  20  10  11  12  11  23
Vocational  low  87  73  48  23  35  29
Apprent. com.  75  29  27  19  26  45
Vocational  com.  42  24  19  29  17  61
Grammar  56  363  10  27  19  28
University (+)11  7  5  6  4  10
Source:  National Labor Office.
All  this  implies  that  workers  with  low  levels  of education  are  hard to  re-employ  in  the  present  economic
context.  In other words, their probability of exit to employment is really low, as can be seen in the following graph:
Graph B1.l
Exit-to-employment probability, by education  levels
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These  results, together with  the evidence  we have presented in this section,  constitute  a strong case  in favor of
reforms of the  education system (i.e. revision of curriculum,  etc.),  as well as in  favor of retraining programs  that take into
account  employers'  needs in terms of skills.
29Box 2.  The Importance of Regional Differences.
As  we mentioned  on Section  B,  there  are  important  regional  differences  in terms  of labor market  outcomes,
and,  in particular,  in terms of unemployment  rates.  These  vary substantially  across  regions  and  differences  have done
nothing but increase  over time.  When we plot the regional unemployment rate against the ratio of unemployed workers
to vacancies,  we find that both variables are positively correlated.  That is, regions with low unemployment rates, such as
Bratislava,  have few unemployed workers per vacancy, and regions with high unemployment rates,  such as Kosice, have
a large number of unemployed  workers per vacancy.
Graph B2.I
Unemployment  rates and number of unemployed  workers
per vacancies  in 2000,  by region.
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This  implies that job  creation is  very poor  in areas where unemployment  is high, and,  hence,  that  individuals
living in these  regions  are  less  likely to  find job than workers  in regions with low unemployment.  This is  confirmed  by
the following graph:
Graph B2.11
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Source:  Unemployment Registry and Labor Force Survey
The  same  regions that  appear  on the  bottom-left  area  of the  first graph  (Bratislava,  Trencin, Trnava),  are  the
ones that  have the  highest  probabilities  of escape  from  unemployment  (hazard  rate),  while  exit  probabilities  are  much
lower  in regions  with high  unemployment  and  low job creation  (Kosice, Banska,  Presov).  Haulikova  and Benc  (World
Bank,  2001)  provide  a  detailed  description  of regional  differences  and  a  discussion  of the  factors  that  underlie  the
relationships described  here.
30106.  We first estimate a probit model for the probability of active search, as a more  formal
test on the relationship between benefit recipiency  and active  search (Table XVI).  According
to the estimation  results, women and married workers are less likely to search actively.  The
relationship  between  search and education  is a complex  one,  in the shape of an inverted-U:
for low levels of education both variables are positively related,  while the opposite is true for
high levels (i.e.  college and beyond).  Interestingly,  social assistance/support  does not have a
significant effect on  active search,  and neither do age (except for workers over 45  searching
less actively) or registration with the Employment Office.
107.  Regarding  unemployment  insurance  benefits,  workers  who  do  not  receive  them
search  less  than  workers  than  do,  on  average.  However,  within  this  group,  we  need  to
differentiate  between  those  who are registered  and those who  are not,  since we just saw in
Table XV that the latter group searches the least. When we do this we find that the difference
in probability  between  workers  who  are currently receiving  benefits and those who  are not
entitled,  but  are registered,  is  8 percentage  points, while  the difference  between those with
unemployment  insurance  and those who  are not entitled  and not registered  is 20 percentage
points.  In  contrast,  those  entitled  to  benefits  and  having  exhausted  them  are  the  ones
searching the most.  These results confirm the prima facie evidence presented in Table XV.
108.  In order to check the extent to which these changes may be driving our results, we re-
estimate the  previous  model for  1996/99  and 2000  separately  (see columns  II and III). Not
surprisingly, being registered  at the  Employment  Office if negatively  correlated with active
search  for  1996/99.  As discussed  above,  this negative  correlation  is most likely due to the
wording of the  search  question, and thus spurious.  In fact, the result  is exactly the opposite
for 2000: registration  with the Employment  Office  seems  to be  a good predictor  for  active
search.  It  is reassuring  to  find  that the  behavioral  differences  between  those  who  receive
unemployment  insurance  (social  assistance/support)  and  those  who  do  not  remain  after
splitting the sample. The same is true about the effect of demographic variables.
109.  Having  shown  then that unemployment  insurance  recipients  search  more than  non-
recipients, we turn now to the issue of their willingness to accept (any) job offers while under
the benefit  system.  For this purpose, we  use the  information  on preferences  for future jobs
available  in  the  Labor  Force  Survey.  We  find  that  individuals  currently  receiving
unemployment  insurance  exhibit  a  slightly  stronger inclination  for salaried jobs than  other
workers,  while those not entitled  to benefits  or not registered  appear to be somewhat  more
entrepreneurial  (Table  XVII).  Registered  workers  with  no  unemployment  insurance  also
seem to  be  more flexible,  given the  larger percentage  of them  who  are  willing to accept a
part-time job, even though full-time employment  is preferable.  Moreover,  it is interesting to
notice  the  differences  between  those  who  are  currently  receiving  unemployment  insurance
and those  who  did  so  in the past.  The  latter are  the  group  with  the  largest  share  of 'any
job/no preference'  responses.  All these pieces  together (weakly)  suggest the existence  of a
negative  relationship  between flexibility  (interpreted  as 'willingness to accept any job') and
unemployment  insurance recipiency.
110.  An alternative  way of getting  at the  issue of selectivity  is to look at the outcome  of
the search process, meaning the quality of the job workers move into.  Although the standard
strategy  for this kind of problem  is to  study wage  differences  between  recipients  and non-
recipients  after  re-employment,  where  higher  wages  are  associated  with  better  matches,
31individual-level  wage data is not available.  Instead, among all other job-related variables, we
choose the duration of the job as the second-best  indicator for quality.27
111.  In  order  to  obtain  information  about  match  duration  after  re-employment  and
compare the experiences  of workers with and without unemployment  insurance, we use data
from the Unemployment Registry.  In this dataset information is collected on the last job held
by  the  individual  prior  to  registration,  so  we  select  those  individuals  who  have  been
registered  twice or more times,  and view any job in-between  unemployment  spells  as  both
the  last job  prior to  the current  spell or  the job  after the  last  spell.  We then  measure  the
duration of each job and construct two different tenure  distributions,  for recipients  and non-
recipients.
112.  On average,  jobs found by workers  with unemployment  insurance are  10.71  months
long, compared  to  8.78 months for those with no benefits,  and the difference  between both
numbers  is  significant  at  the  1 percent  level.  In  addition,  Graph  IV  presents  both
distributions.  Not  only they  are  visually  different,  with the  one  corresponding  to workers
with no benefits  containing  a much  larger number  of very short spells, but the equality  of
both distributions can be rejected using a Kolmogorov-Smimov  test.
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113.  In sum, workers who receive  unemployment  insurance  search actively  for jobs more
frequently than  those  who  do not,  and  appear  to be  slightly pickier  regarding  the kind of
employment  offers  they  are  willing  to  accept,  to  the  extent  that  they  exhibit  a  stronger
preference  for salaried work  and less  flexibility  regarding  their work  schedule.  They  also
seem to obtain better matches,  or at least matches that last longer.  Whereas this is really the
product of their more intense search, or whether the same  would be true were unemployment
insurance  payments  reduced  or  eliminated  is  something  that,  unfortunately,  we  cannot
determine.
27  We have also looked at industry and occupation of re-employment,  as well as reason for job termination,  and
found no significant differences  across groups.  Unfortunately we have no data on contract type (i.e. temporary,
open-ended), or work schedule (full/part-time).
32Box 3.  The Social  Safety Net and Household  Behavior
We turn  here to the issue of interactions  among  household members,  and the role that Ul and,  especially,
SA play  in shaping  labor-market related  decisions  at the household  level.  We have already  discussed  the  potential
disincentive effects associated with both systems,  and how these can be particularly  pervasive  in the case of families
with young children.  For this reason,  we have selected  for this part of the analysis only those households where both
parents  are  between the ages of 20  and  40,  and  where  children  are  present.  Under this selection  rule,  the sample
includes a total of 5,701  such families.
Employment  rates  are high among  adults  in these  households:  approximately  half the families  have both
adults  working  (Table  B3.1).  However,  if we  look  only  at  those  households  that  receive  SA/SS,  most  families
contain at least one  unemployed  adult,  or an adult  who  is out of the labor force  (typically the spouse).  In addition,
most  SA  is  given  to  spouses,  and  spouses  are  also  the  group  with the  largest  share  of recipients,  followed  by
household  heads  (Table  B3.II).  Also, while 88  percent of all households heads  receiving  SA are unemployed,  only
63  percent of the spouses  are  (67 percent  if we exclude  maternity allowances).  This  implies that,  most likely,  the
majority  of household  heads  receive  SA  once  their  UI  benefits  are  exhausted,  whereas,  in  the  case  of spouses,
recipiency seems to respond to a broader set of reasons  (e.g. household-level variables).
These figures  suggest that SA (and UT),  received by both the individual  and other household members, may
have  and  effects  on  labor  force  participation  and job  search decisions.  To  explore this  issue more  rigurously,  we
estimate  two different probit models  for the probability  of participation  and the probability of (active)  search.  The
sample for the first model  contains all non-employed  individuals, while the sample  for the second model contains all
unemployed  individuals  in 2000 (following our previous discussion on the accuracy of the search questions in 1996
and  1999).  We  estimate  both  models  separately  for  household  heads  and  spouses,  since  we  believe  that  the
sensitivity of each group to potential disincentives is very different (Table B3.II).
In the case  of male  household heads,  individual  recipiency  of either Ul  or SA  is,  if anything,  positively
correlated with labor-market  participation and active search.  In contrast,  SA has a very strong negative  effect on the
participation  and search decisions of female household heads.  In connection with this result, it is important to clarify
that women on maternity leave are counted as  labor force participants,  and to notice that the indicator for presence  of
children below age  6 is  not significant.  On the  other hand,  spousal recipiency  of any type of benefits does not seem
to  have  a significant  effect  on either  decision.  This  is  not  surprising,  given  that most  household  heads  are  also
considered  to be the  main earner in  the  family,  increasing  their attachment  to the labor force  (e.g. most  household
heads on SA are unemployed,  rather than out of the labor force).
However,  when  we  re-estimate  these  models  on the  sample  of spouses,  generally  perceived  to be  less
attached to the labor force and, thus, more susceptible to potential  disincentive effects, we obtain very similar results:
a positive  effect of individual  recipiency  on both participation  and search, and no effect of 'partner's'  recipiency.  In
fact, the only difference  between both sets of regressions  is that, in the case of spouses,  the presence of small children
does have a strong negative effect on the participation and search decisions.
Given this evidence,  we must conclude that there is no apparent disincentive  effect associated with SA and
Ul  at the  household  level,  neither  in  terms of labor force  participation  nor in  terms of active job  search.  These
results,  however,  need  to  be taken  with  a  pinch  of salt.  We  have  already  discussed  the existence  of numerous
confounding factors  concerning benefits  and behavior  in the labor market, some of then arising from the functioning
of the system  and some  other spurring  from the way the  data is  collected.  Moreover,  the sample size  is relatively
small for the search models.
33H.  DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
114.  We have presented  numerous  sets of results  in the previous section and, although we
have tried to discussed them in a way that followed the natural  flow of ideas,  this may be a
good time to summarize what we have learnt so far before we move on to talk about policy
recommendations.
What it all means, in a nutshell...
115.  We  have  shown  that  workers  who  receive  unemployment  insurance  and/or  social
assistance/support  tend to spend  more time unemployed than  workers  who are  not untitled  to these
benefits.  In particular,  the average  spell for recipients is about two months  longer than the average
spell  for  non-recipients,  and  benefit  entitlement  explains  most  of this  difference.  We  view  this
relationship  between  recipiency  and unemployment  duration  as  evidence  of the disincentive  effects
associated with these programs.
116.  However,  workers  who  receive  unemployment  insurance/social  assistance/support
also look for employment  more actively than their counterparts,  and have  more demanding
preferences  regarding  their  future  jobs.  This  seems  to  suggest  that benefit  payments,  by
reducing the opportunity  cost of unemployment,  act as a  subsidy for these workers'  search
time and allow them to be 'choosier'.  In addition, and maybe as a consequence of the above,
benefit recipients  find jobs in  the  private  sector more  often,  and these jobs turn  out to be
better matches than the ones obtained by non-recipients  (where match quality  is measured as
duration of the match) - the average employment spell for those who received unemployment
insurance/social  assistance/support  is  almost  11  months  long,  compared  to  9  months  for
workers with no benefits.
117.  We  need  to  be  cautious  when  interpreting  these  results.  Given  the  demographic
differences  that exist between recipients and non-recipients,  it is difficult to draw any causal
conclusions  from  the  analysis.  In  particular,  we  cannot  dismiss  completely  the  idea that
benefit recipients constitute a pool of better workers, younger and more educated, who search
more actively and find jobs more often anyway, regardless of their entitlement status.  To get
at this point, it is interesting to complement  our comparison of recipients  and non-recipients,
with a discussion of the behavioral differences  that arise within the former group.
118.  As  we  have  emphasized  again  and  again  in  the  previous  section,  unemployment
insurance and social assistance/support  recipients  cannot be treated as a single, homogenous
group,  since  their  behavior  varies  tremendously  depending  on  whether  they  are  actually
receiving  benefits or not.  In particular, they exit the registry  at a higher rate,  search  more
actively,  and move into private-sector jobs more often, once benefits are exhausted.  So when
we use  these  workers  as  their  own  control  group,  performing  a within-group  comparison
rather  than  a  between-group  comparison,  we  do  find  strong  evidence  that  both
unemployment  insurance  and social  assistance/support  have  important  disincentive  effects,
not only on unemployment duration, but also on search behavior and on exit-to-employment.
119.  However, before concluding  from this last set of results that these programs should be
drastically reformed, we need to think about their function in a broader context.
34What good  are unemployment insurance and social  assistance/support buying us?
120.  All safety  net programs can be thought of as income support programs, regardless of
whether they are insurance-based,  like unemployment insurance,  or means-tested,  like social
assistance  or social support.  This particular dimension is likely to be important  in situations
of economic  change  and transformation,  expected to affect a substantial  fraction  of the labor
force  or,  in  general,  the  population.  The  Slovak Republic  has  experienced  such  a period
during  the  last decade  or so,  as part of the process  of economic  transition,  hence  it is only
logical  to  expand  the  scope  of our  analysis  to  account  for  the effect  that  unemployment
insurance  and social assistance/support may have had on poverty.
121.  Unfortunately,  we can only present figures for 1996, a snapshot rather than a story in
evolution.  We  use  four  different  measures  of poverty  to  check  for  the robustness  of the
results  and,  although the poverty  numbers vary substantially  according to the measure used,
the qualitative  effects  of the  programs  are  very  similar  across  all four.  To  illustrate  such
effects,  we perform  the  following  exercise:  we  calculate  poverty  incidence  based on total
income  (TI), and then we compare this number with incidence  figures based on total income
minus  unemployment  insurance,  total  income  minus  social  assistance/support,  and  total
income  minus  all  social  income.28 The  marginal  effect  of each  program(s)  can  then be
understood as the change in the poverty rate.
122.  Not surprisingly, when  we  consider the total population  as the group of reference,  it
can be seen that the effect of social assistance/support  on poverty is much  stronger than that
of unemployment  insurance  (Table  XVIII).  After  all,  the  eligibility  rules  for  social
assistance/support!SS  are  based  on  income,  thus  targeting  the  poor,  and  the  number  of
recipients is much larger.
123.  If instead we concentrate  on a smaller  segment of the population,  namely  active  and
unemployed  individuals,  and  distinguish  between  these two  groups,  the results differ  from
the ones  discussed above (Table XIX).  In particular,  unemployment  insurance plays a very
important role preventing poverty among the unemployed, while social assistance/support  are
most  likely  mechanisms  of last  resort  for  this  group.  In  contrast,  among  active  workers,
social assistance/support/SS  represent a more important source of support.
What to do next.
124.  In  sum,  although  social  assistance/support/SS  take  most  of the  burden  in the  fight
against poverty, unemployment  insurance  plays a crucial role in the case of the unemployed.
This protection  does  not come  free.  As  we have  shown  in this paper,  there  are  significant
disincentive  effects  associated  with  benefit recipiency.  Any reform  plan  should then take
into  account both  aspects of these programs,  together with the government  goals and views
on the ideal role of these different instruments.
125.  There are, however,  a series of recommendations  that we can unambiguously  make at
this  point,  and  that  are  very  much  in  line with  those  contemplated  in  the  Social  Benefits
Reform  Administration  Project.  In  particular,  we  consider  that  a  higher  degree  of
28 Notice that in all cases pensions are included  in total income.
35harmonization  and  coordination  across  different  programs  is  needed  in  order  to  improve
targeting, reduce administrative  costs,  and prevent potential  fraud.  As part of this process,  it
would  be  desirable  to  substantially  simplify  the  rules  governing  the  different  programs,
specially  social  assistance/support  and  SS,  and  to  create  better  data  linkages  and  faster
information flows between different agencies and programs.
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38Annex  I  Unemployment  and the Unemployed
Table AI.1  Unemployment Rate




1993  13.7  14.4
1994  14.1  14.6
1995  12.4  13.1
1996  10.9  12.8
1997  11.8  12.5
1998  12.5  15.6
1999  17.1  19.2
2000  18.7  17.5
Source:  Labor Force  Survey and Unemployment Registry.
Table AI.2  Distributi2n of Unemp oyment Spel s by Duration
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
< 6 montbs  32.4  30.3  32.3  32.8  32.1  30.83  24.45
< 12 months  49.9  44.9  46.9  47.4  48.8  50.88  44.95
12 + months  50.1  55.1  53.1  52.6  49.7  49.12  55.05
Source: Labor Force Survey.
Table AI.3  Registered Unemployment  Dynamics
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Inflow/Stock  18.3  8.8  10.7  7.4  8.5  9.8  99  94  7.9  7.1
Outflow/Stock  5.2  10.0  7.9  8.2  9.4  9.9  9.4  7.7  6.1  7.5
Outflow/Inflow  28.4  113.8  73.9  110.0  110.7  100.9  95.5  81.4  76.9  106.6
(Outflow+Inflow)/Stock  23.5  18.9  18.5  15.6  17.9  19.7  19.3  17.1  13.9  14.6
Source: Unemployment  Registry.
Table AI.4  Unempl  ment Rates by Education Levels
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
None  44.2  39.5  64.3  66.7  88.5  NA  NA
Basic  27.4  26.9  23.7  27.6  25.8  33.6  39.0
Apprent. low  14.4  13.1  10.8  11.0  12.7  17.4  20.6
Vocational  low  13.6  12.7  10.0  11.3  10.8  18.95  19.9
Apprent. com.  15.3  9.5  8.1  10.6  9.6  15.6  19.6
Vocationalcom.  9.8  7.1  7.4  8.2  8.7  13.10  14.0
Grammar  13.1  14.3  11.8  14.6  13.8  17.12  17.7
University (+)  3.8  2.9  3.4  3.2  4.2  5.5  4.8
Source:  Labor Force  Survey.
39Table AI.5  Unemployment Rates by Education Levels and Gender
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F
None  47.8  40.0  34.8  45.0  50.0  66.7  50.0  75.0  87.5  9.90  NA  NA  NA  NA
Basic  32.1  23.6  29.8  24.7  26.0  22.0  33.4  22.0  30.2  22.3  39.2  29.4  48.1  32.0
Apprent.  13.7  15.7  12.2  14.7  9.8  12.6  10.2  12.5  11.8  14.7  17.8  16.7  20.6  20.5
low  ___
Vocational  12.7  15.0  10.8  15.7  8.6  12.6  8.4  16.8  8.7  14.6  16.5  23.0  18.8  21.5
low  I____
Apprent.  15.1  15.6  7.2  13.7  6.8  10.2  9.5  12.3  9.8  9.3  15.9  15.2  17.8  22.7
Vocational  8.6  10.7  6.2  7.8  6.2  8.3  6.7  9.5  7.1  9.8  13.3  12.8  14.2  13.8
Grammar  14.9  12.1  13.1  15.0  7.1  14.4  10.2  17.0  9.9  16.0  16.7  17.3  19.2  16.9
University  3.4  4.4  2.2  3.7  2.8  4.1  2.9  3.7  3.6  5.0  5.5  5.6  5.8  3.4
Source: Labor Force Survey.
Table A1.6  Unemployment Rate by Age Groups
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
15-64 (All)  13.8  12.1  10.6  11.7  12.0  16.7  18.6
15-24  26.5  22.4  19.4  23.5  26.6  33.7  35.9
25-49  11.5  10.4  9.2  9.8  9.5  13.8  15.8
50-64  8.2  7.1  5.7  6.6  6.8  10.2  13.4
Source: Labor Force Survey
Table AI.7  Unemployment Rate by Age Groups and Gender
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F
15-64  13.6  14.0  11.4  12.9  9.5  11.7  11.0  12.5  11.1  12.9  17.2  16.1  19.6  17.6
(All)  __
15-24  28.3  24.4  24.3  20.1  19.1  19.9  24.3  22.5  27.1  25.9  36.3  30.8  39.9  31.7
25-49  11.0  12.2  9.0  11.9  7.9  10.6  8.8  10.8  8.4  10.9  13.5  14.1  16.0  15.7
50-64  7.6  1 9.1  7.0  1 7.3  5.5  16.2  5.8  1 7.9  6.8  7.0  12.0  7.4  15.1  10.7
Source: Labor Force Survey.
Table Al.8  Unemployment  Rates by Position in Household
[  l  1996  1999  2000
[Head  6.92  11.68  13.90
Spouse  |  10.61  |  13.40  I  14.81
[Other  16.84  24.42  26.95
Source:  Labor Force  Survey.
__________  __________  Table AI.9  Unemploymet  Rates by Region  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
__  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  1996  1999  2000
Bratislava  3.71  7.59  6.78
Trana  6.46  12.20  15.15
Trencin  5.85  11.76  13.86
Nitra  8.35  18.55  20.55
Zilina  6.09  15.78  18.03
Banska Bystrica  7.89  20.20  21.88
Presov  8.64  18.91  21.60
Kosice  9.50  24.15  26.00
Source: Labor Force Survey
40Annex  II  Examples of the Income Coverage Provided by the Safety Net
A couple  without children
The  MSL  for  a  family  of these  characteristics  is  SK5,490,  and  child allowances  are  calculated  as
described in section ???.
A.  Unemployed/NLF  spouse
Individual and HH income  UI  UI  SA (Objective)
First 3 months  After first 3 months
(RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Individual income (AW)  5,400  4,927  3,230
(0.49)  (0.45)  (0.29)
HH income (AW)  5,490  5,490  5,490
(0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)
Individual income (MW)  3,230  3,230  3,230
(0.90)  (0.90)  (0.90)
HH income (MW)  5,490  5,490  5,490
(1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)
B.  Spouse employed at average wage
Individual and HH income  UI  UI  SA (Objective)
First 3 months  After first 3 months
(RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Individual income  (AW)  5,400  4,927  0
_ __________________________  (0.49)  (0.45)
HH income (AW)  16,350  15,877  10,950
(0.74)  (0.72)  (0.50)
Individual income (MW)  1,800  1,620  0
(0.50)  (0.45)
HR income (MW)  12,750  12,570  10,950
(0.87)  (0.86)  (0.75)
C.  Spouse employed at minimum wage
Individual and HH income  UT  UI  SA (Objective)
First 3 months  After first 3 months
(RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Individual income  (AW)  5,400  4,927  0
(0.49)  (0.45)
HH income  (AW)  9,000  8,527  5,490
(0.62)  (0.59)  (0.38)
Individual income  (MW)  1,890  1,890  1,890
(0.63)  (0.63)  (0.63)
HH income (MW)  5,490  5,490  5,490
(0.76)  (0.76)  (0.76)
41A couple  with two young children
We assume that both children  are unemployed (i.e. lack any means of subsistence),  and that they are
between  15  and 25  years  old.  Then,  the MLS  for the household is  SK8,410,  and child  allowances
amount  to  SKI,680  (if HH  income  under  1.36  * MLS  =  SKI1,437)  or  SKI,100  (if HH  income
between  1.36 and 1.99 times MSL = SKI 1,437 to SK16,735).
A.  Unemployed  spouse
Individual and HH income  UI  UI  SA (Objective)
First 3 months  After first 3 months
(RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Individual income (AW)  5,400  4,927  3,230
(0.49)  (0.45)  (0.29)
HH income (AW)  10,090  10,090  10,090
(0.80)  (0.80)  (0.80)
Individual  income (MW)  3,230  3,230  3,230
(0.90)  (0.90)  (0.90)
HH income (MW)  10,090  10,090  10,090
(1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)
B.  Spouse employed at average wage
Individual and HR income  Ut  UI  SA (Objective)
First 3 months  After first 3 months
(RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Individual income (AW)  5,400  4,927  0
(0.49)  (0.45)
HR income (AW)  17,450  16,347  12,630
(0.80)  (0.75)  (0.58)
Individual income  (MW)  1,800  1,620  0
(0.50)  (0.45)
HH income (MW)  13,850  13,670  12,630
__  (0.96)  (0.95)  (0.87)
C.  Spouse employed at minimum wage
Individual and HH income  UI  Ut  SA (Objective)
First 3 months  After first 3 months
(RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Individual income (AW)  5,400  4,927  0
(0.49)  (0.45)
RH income (AW)  10,680  10,207  10,090
.______  _______  ___  _  (0.74)  (0.71)  (0.70)
Individual income (MW)  3,230  3,230  3,230
(0.90)  (0.90)  (0.90)
HH income (MW)  10,090  10,090  10,090
(1.20)  (1.20)  (1.20)
42Couple with two young children and a pensioner in the house
We now assume that the family  described above now lives with a pensioner who receives the average
pension of SK4,550.  The MSL then becomes  SK10,670, while child  allowance payments remain the
same.
A.  Unemployed  spouse
Individual and HH income  UI  UI  SA (Objective)
First 3 months  After first 3 months
(RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Individual income (AW)  5,400  4,927  3,230
(0.49)  (0.45)  (0.29)
HU income (AW)  12,350  12,350  12,350
(0.72)  (0.72)  (0.72)
Individual income (MW)  3,230  3,230  3,230
(0.90)  (0.90)  (0.90)
HH income  (MW)  12,350  12,350  12,350
(1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)
B.  Spouse employed at average wage
Individual and HH income  UI  UI  SA (Objective)
First 3 months  After first 3 months  (no  Ul)
(RR 50%)  (RR45%)
Individual income  (AW)  5,400  4,927  0
(0.49)  (0.45)
HH income  (AW)  22,000  21,527  16,600
(0.83)  (0.81)  (0.63)
Individual income (MW)  1,800  1,620  0
(0.50)  (0.45)
HH income  (MW)  18,400  18,220  16,600
(0.96)  (0.96)  (0.87)
C.  Spouse employed at minimum wage
Individual and HH income  UI  Ul  SA (Objective)
First  3 months  After first 3 months  (no UI)
(RR 50%)  (RR 45%)
Individual income  (AW)  5,400  4,927  0
(0.49)  (0.45)
1H  income  (AW)  15,230  14,757  12,350
(0.80)  (0.77)  (0.65)
Individual income (MW)  2,520  2,520  2,520
(0.63)  (0.63)  (0.63)
HH income  (MW)  12,350  12,350  12,350
(1.16)  (1.16)  (1.16)
43Annex III  Additional Tables and Figures
Table AIII.1  Sample Proportions -Unemployment Re  *stry
Variables  (I)  (II)  (III)
All spells  Unemployed more than 3  Unemployed  more than
months  12 months
AUl  UI  NoUl  Ur  NoU  U  U  No Ul
Female  46.26  45.17  47.14  45.88  48.59  49.16  49.69
Married  49.04  51.17  47.34  52.65  50.79  53.87  54.68
Age (years)  32.08  32.58  31.69  33.03  32.53  33.77  33.28
16-25  37.45  36.94  37.88  35.67  33.76  33.42  29.36
26-35  27.15  25.29  28.62  24.39  29.81  24.15  31.72
36-45  20.65  21.47  20.00  22.53  21.72  22.71  23.21
46-55  11.61  12.96  10.53  13.83  11.21  15.18  11.67
56-65  3.13  3.34  2.97  3.58  3.50  4.54  4.04
No studies  1.32  0.65  1.89  0.77  2.83  1.34  4.6
Primary  19.94  15.45  23.52  17.05  32.94  22.92  46.33
Apprenticeship  41.46  45.20  38.49  44.48  34.35  40.84  27.20
Secondary  31.26  33.11  29.80  33.14  26.01  31.29  19.80
College (+)  5.99  5.59  6.30  4.56  3.87  3.61  2.07
No work exp.  33.92  29.46  37.47  29.43  38.52  30.01  38.82
Bratislava  4.67  4.66  4.73  4.34  3.68  2.75  2.37
Trnava  8.49  8.66  8.35  8.41  7.39  7.76  7.37
Trencin  8.29  7.99  8.53  7.69  8.16  7.09  6.29
Nitra  16.08  15.87  16.25  16.04  17.24  16.13  16.47
Zilina  12.40  12.72  12.15  12.48  10.86  11.63  7.95
Banska Bystrica  13.87  12.71  14.80  12.93  15.66  13.93  18.46
Presov  17.15  18.55  16.04  18.73  16.26  18.72  17.52
Kosice  19.01  18.84  19.15  19.38  20.75  21.99  23.57
Ul during spell  44.32  100.00  0.00  100.00  0.00  100.00  0.00
Length of spell  10.42  12.12  9.07  14.86  16.27  26.03  29.97
Transition to emp
Number of spells  30714  13614  17100  10701  8833  4314  3606
Source: Unemployment  Registry,  1990-2000.
44Table AIII.2  Sample Proportions - Labor Force Survey
Variables  All  No UI  Ul  No Ul  UI
individuals  +  +  +  +
No SA  No SA  SA  SA
Female  44.29  50.96  40.28  47.26  38.17
Married  42.62  42.30  50.61  27.30  41.90
Age (years)  29.27  27.95  32.03  25.03  29.85
16-25  47.31  49.86  37.48  65.36  44.41
26-35  21.04  24.67  19.43  18.07  25.31
36-45  18.73  16.02  24.50  12.24  14.52
46-55  12.92  9.45  18.59  4.33  15.76
Primary  12.85  14.12  12.7  14.32  7.07
Apprenticeship  41.28  38.14  43.00  38.04  48.96
Secondary  41.04  42.14  40.46  41.24  40.24
College (+)  4.83  5.60  3.84  6.40  3.73
No work exp.  29.74  30.44  19.15  51.78  26.14
Bratislava  5.88  11.25  5.85  1.73  1.28
Trnava  8.12  10.57  10.04  3.57  3.31
Trencin  5.24  3.84  4.88  6.77  7.05
Nitra  8.08  7.69  6.94  11.86  5.80
Zilina  17.47  13.62  19.06  17.51  20.33
Banska Bystrica  13.93  12.98  13.80  15.44  13.69
Presov  23.24  22.59  23.19  24.67  21.99
Kosice  18.04  17.46  16.24  18.45  26.55
UI during spell  53.06  0.00  100.00  0.00  100.00
SA during spell  31.36  0.00  0.00  100.00  100.00
Searching actively  53.55  54.48  50.23  48.96  75.93
Length of spell  5.13  3.55  4.67  6.04  9.21
Transition to emp  15.84  18.42  16.43  14.50  9.54
Head  20.57  16.83  26.49  12.82  21.17
Spouse  17.55  20.19  19.71  11.67  14.10
Other  61.88  62.98  53.80  75.51  64.73
Household size  4.41  4.32  4.40  4.47  4.52
UI in household  10.48  6.08  15.02  7.15  9.12
SA in household  18.61  11.21  16.61  25.80  30.70
# children < 6  0.15  0.20  0.13  0.16  0.13
# dependents  0.97  0.99  0.97  0.96  0.96
Dependency ratio  19.63  20.54  19.57  19.10  18.73
HH unemp. rate  55.95  52.65  57.13  57.81  55.20
Number of ind  2,465  629  1065  531  241
Source: Labor Force  Survey  1996:1-1996:4,  1999:1-1999:4,  and 2000:1-2000:2.
45Table AIII.3  Unemployment Insurance and Social Assistance in the Labor Force Survey Sample
I  UI  I  SA  UI+SA
ILO  Registered  ILO  Registered  ILO  Registered
1996.Q1  9.93  11.48  50.19  55.69  -
1996.Q2  9.33  10.80  51.21  56.34  - -
1996.Q3  10.11  11.44  46.67  52.96  - -
1996.Q4  11.06  11.79  47.82  53.94  - -
1999.Q1  30.19  31.94  44.95  50.45  - -
1999.Q2  31.83  32.57  46.83  52.78  - -
1999.Q3  29.56  29.86  48.97  54.42
1999.Q4  27.38  27.37  53.31  58.00  - -
2000.Q1  28.61  29.64  53.41  55.59  1.30  1.27
2000.Q2  26.02  26.28  53.69  56.76  1.30  1.24
Source: Labor Force Survey,  1996: 1-1996:4,  1999:1-1999:4, and 2000:1-2000:2.
46Table AIII.4  Probability of Exit to Employment in the Private Sector (Marginal Effects)
Variables  Baseline  I  II
Receives  Ul  0.005  -0.021
(0.015)  (0.015)
Receives  SA  0.007  0.007
(0.017)  (0.017)
Duration of spell  -0.006  -0.006 
(0.002)  (0.002)
Past UI  -0.009
___  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  _  __  __  __  __  __  _  _  _(0.027)
Female  (=1)  0.005  0.003  0.005
(0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)
Married (=I)  -0.020  -0.022  -0.020
(0.021)  (0.021)  (0.019)
26-35  -0.018  -0.019  -0.021
(0.019)  (0.019)  (0.017)
36-45  -0.030  -0.034  -0.024
(0.023)  (0.022)  (0.021)
46-55  -0.015  -0.017  -0.010
(0.028)  (0.028)  (0.027)
Apprenticeship  0.052"  0.052"  0.044
(0.024)  (0.024)  (0.022)
Secondary  0.030  0.028  0.025
(0.024)  (0.024)  (0.022)
College(+)  0.199  0.189"  0.184 
(0.064)  (0.064)  (0.061)
No  previous exp.  -0.073  -0.070"  -0.071  '
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)
Head of HH  0.010  0.016  0.010
(0.028)  (0.029)  (0.026)
Spouse of head  -0.008  -0.001  -0.007
(0.029)  (0.030)  (0.027)
Occupation  YES  YES  YES
Sector  YES  YES  YES
Region  YES  YES  YES
Year  YES  YES  YES
Quarter  YES  YES  YES
Observed prob.  15.84  15.84
Predicted prob.  10.73  10.59  __
Prob > Chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000
Number if individuals  2,465  2,465  2,465
Number of pseudo-spells  2,465  2,465  2,680
Source:  Labor Force Survey  1996:1-1996:4,  1999:1-1999:4, and 2000:1-2000:2.
Coefficients represent marginal effects evaluated at sample means.
Robust standard errors in parentheses  (errors clustered at the individual  level).
Significant at the 5 percent level.  Significant at the  10 percent level.
Baseline comparison:  Single male,  16-25 years old, with primary studies and previous employment  experience.
Only exit to employment  in the private sector was considered  as a successful exit.  Qualitatively and quantitatively equivalent
results are obtained  when exit to both employment  in the private sector and employment  in a public employment program are
considered instead.
47Table I  Summa  of Evolution of U  employment  Insurance System  1992-2  00
Years  Qualification  Duration of  Replacement ratio  No previous  Maximum
Requirements  benefits  experience  benefit payment
1992  12 months of  6 months (down  (i) 60% of  average  (i) 60% of  (i)  1.5 *
contributions  in  from 12 months)  net wage for the  minimum wage  minimum wage
last 3 years  first 3 months  for the first 3  (ii)  1.8 *
(from 65%)  months  minimum wage
(ii) 50% of average  (ii) 50% of  if completed
net wage after first  minimum wage  retraining
3 months (from  after first 3
60%)  months
(iii) 70% of  (iii) 70% of
average net wage if  minimum wage
under retraining  if under
retraining
1993  12 months of  6 months  (i) 60% of average  45% of  1.5 * minimum
contributions  in  net wage for the  minimum wage  wage
last 3 years  first 3 months
(ii) 50% of average
net wage after first
3 months
1994  12 months of  (i) 6 months if  (i) 60% of average  45% of  1.5 * minimum
contributions in  15-30 years old  net wage for the  minimum wage  wage
last 3 years  (ii) 8 months if  first 3 months
30-45 years old  (ii) 50% of average
(iii) 9 months if  net wage after first
above 45 years  3  months
1995  12 months of  (i) 6 months if  (i) 60% of average  45% of  1.5 * minimum
contributions in  15-30 years old  net wage for the  minimum wage  wage
last 3 years  (ii) 8 months if  first 3 months
30-45 years old  (ii) 50%  of average
(iii) 9 months if  net wage after first
45-50 years old  3 months
(iv)  12 months if
above 50
1997-98  12 months of  (i) 6 months if  (i) 60% of average  45% of  1.8 * minimum
contributions in  contributed for  net wage for the  minimum wage  wage
last 3 years  less than 15  first 3 months
years  (ii) 50% of average
(ii) 9 months if  net wage after first
contributed for  3 months
15-25 years




1999  6 months of  (i) 6 months if  (i) 50% of average  45% of  1.5  * minimum
contributions in  contributed for  net wage for the  minimum wage  wage (or
last 3 years  less than  15  first 3 months  subsistence
years  (ii) 45%  of average  level)
(ii) 9 months is  net wage after first
contributed for  3 months
more than 15
years
48Table II  Registered  Unemployed  Receiving  Unemployment  Insurance (UI) and/or
Social Assistance  (SA)
Registered  Receiving  UI  Receiving  Ul  Receiving  SA  Receiving  SA
unemployed  (Total)  (%)  (Total)  (%)
1991  301,951  247,728  82.00  NA
1992  260,274  87,322  33.55  NA
1993  368,095  122,853  33.37  101,607  27.60
1994  371,481  85,032  22.89  168,416  45.33
1995  333,291  89,995  27.00  147,101  44.13
1996  329,749  93,517  28.36  135,440  41.07
1997  347,753  92,914  26.72  155,345  44.67
1998  428,209  119,931  28.01  193,706  45.24
1999  535,211  144,690  27.03  272,813  50.97
Source: Social Policy. Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family.
Table III Expenditure on Social  Assistance  and Labor Market Policies (in miions SK)
Social Assistance  Labor Market Policies  Benefits  to
registered
Total  To registered  Passive  Active  unemployed
unemployed  (UIA benefits)  (Total)
1991  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
1992  2,218  1,526  1,711  3,812  3,237
1993  3,120  2,200  1,859  1,107  4,059
1994  5,134  3,824  1,710  1,896  5,534
1995  5,517  4,058  2,181  3,899  6,239
1996  5,510  3,850  3,063  4,290  6,913
1997  5,891  4,154  3,989  3,098  8,143
1998  7,978  5,813  5,484  2,289  11,297
1999  11,599  8,790  7,292  474  16,082
Source: Social Policy. Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs  and Family.
A  Unemployment  Insurance.
Table IV  Persons in Material Destitution Receiving  Social  Assistance  (SA
Persons in  Recipients of  Recipients of  Couples with  Individuals or
material  SA  SA  dependent  couples w/o
destitution  (Total)  (%)  children  dependent
children
1991  NA  NA  _
1992  NA  NA
1993  NA  NA  -
1994  442,544  199,127  44.99  89,214  90,718
1995  408,507  176,705  43.25  79,525  83,364
1996  378,637  160,788  42.46  72,679  78,443
1997  392,927  174,971  44.53  71,153  97,255
1998  506,400  222,655  43.96  NA  NA
1999  584,941  297,688  50.89  93,799  202,805
Source: Social Policy. Ministry of  Labor, Social Affairs  and Family.
49Table V  Social Support Programs
Child allowance  I  Parental allowance
Number of  Expenditure  Number of  Expenditure
recipients  (in million SK)  recipients  (in million SK)
1995  682,045  10,002  154,012  2,519
1996  653,938  9,982  144,101  2,758
1997  594,219  9,119  142,134  4,116
1998  603,445  9,925  139,876  4,479
1999  568,951  9,190  137,931  4,417
Source: Social Policy. Ministry of Labor,  Social Affairs and Family.
Table VI  Distribution of Spells
Spells per individual  Number of individuals  Percentage of all individuals
1  10,287  56.71
2  4,537  25.01
3  2,186  12.05
4  860  4.74
5  271  1.49
Total  18,141  100.00
Source: Unemployment Registry, 1990-2000.
Table VII  Distribution of Unem  lo  ment S  ells by Duration
Duration of spell (in months)  Number of spells  Percent of all spells
Less than 3  11,180  36.40
4 to 6  5,629  18.33
6 to  12  5,985  19.49
12 to 24  4,622  15.05
More than 24  3,298  10.74
Total  30,714  100.00
Source: Unemployment Registry,  1990-2000.
50Table VIII  Sample Proportions
Variables  (I)  ([l)
Unemployment  Registry  Labor Force Survey
UIA  No UI  All  Ul and/or  No UI or
All  SAB  SA
Female  46.26  45.17  47.14  44.29  42.02  50.96
Married  49.04  51.17  47.34  42.62  42.73  42.30
Age (years)  32.08  32.58  31.69  29.27  29.72  27.95
16-25  37.45  36.94  37.88  47.31  46.45  49.86
26-35  27.15  25.29  28.62  21.04  19.81  24.67
36-45  20.65  21.47  20.00  18.73  19.65  16.02
46-55  11.61  12.96  10.53  12.92  14.09  9.45
56-65  3.13  3.34  2.97  Nis 
No studies  1.32  0.65  1.89
Primary  19.94  15.45  23.52  12.85  12.42  14.12
Apprenticeship  41.46  45.20  38.49  41.28  42.35  38.14
Secondary  31.26  33.11  29.80  41.04  40.66  42.14
College  (+)  5.99  5.59  6.30  4.83  4.57  5.60
No work exp.  33.92  29.46  37.47  29.74  29.50  30.44
Bratislava  4.67  4.66  4.73  5.88  4.06  11.25
Trnava  8.49  8.66  8.35  8.12  7.29  10.57
Trencin  8.29  7.99  8.53  5.24  5.71  3.84
Nitra  16.08  15.87  16.25  8.08  8.21  7.69
Zilina  12.40  12.72  12.15  17.47  18.78  13.62
Banska  Bystrica  13.87  12.71  14.80  13.93  14.26  12.98
Presov  17.15  18.55  16.04  23.24  23.46  22.59
Kosice  _19.01  18.84  19.15  18.04  18.23  17.46
Registered atEO  100.00  100.00  100.00  91.30  99.13  68.27
UT during spell  44.32  100.00  0.00  53.06  71.09  0.00
Length of spell  10.42  12.12  9.07  5.13  5.66  3.55
Transition to emp  59.80  65.30  55.42  15.84  14.97  18.42
Head of HH  20.57  21.84  16.83
Spouse  of head  17.55  16.65  20.19
Other members  61.88  61.51  62.98
HH size  4.41  4.43  4.32
# children < 6  D  0.15  0.14  0.20
Dependency  ratio  NA  19.63  19.32  20.54
SA during spell  31.36  42.02  0.00
UT in household  10.48  11.97  6.08
SA in household  18.61  21.12  11.21
HH unemp. rate  55.95  57.08  52.65
Seaching actively  53.55  53.23  54.48
Number of spells  30,714  13,614  17,100  2,465  1,836  629
Number of ind  18,141  10,779  11,578  2,465  1,836  629
Source: Unemployment  Registry  1990-2000 and  Labor Force  Survey  1996:1-1996:4,  1999:1-1999:4,  and 2000:1-2000:2.
AUnemployment  Insurance.
B  Social Assistance/Support.
c Not included in sample.
D Not available  in sample.
51Table IX  Distribution of Unemployment Spells  by Duration
Duration of spell (in months)  Number of spells  Percent of all spells
Less than 3  1,196  48.60
4 to 6  681  27.67
6 to 12  458  18.61
12 to 24  96  3.90
More than 24  30  1.22
Total  2,465  100.00
Source: Labor Force Survey  1996:1-1996:4,  1999:1-1999:4,  and 2000:1-2000:2.
Table X  Unemploym  nt Duration by Unemployment  Ins  rance (UI) Recipiency
Duration of spell  % of all spells with UI  % of all spells without UI
(in months)  .
Less than 3  21.40  48.35
4 to 6  21.02  16.19
6 to 12  25.90  14.38
12 to 24  19.92  11.17
More than 24  11.77  9.92
Source: Unemployment Registry,  1990-2000.
Table XI  Distribution of Spells b  -Actual- Duration of Benefits (both in months)
Benefits  0-3  4-6  7-9  10-12
S  p  ell_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Oto3  61.05
4 to 6  15.06  31.10  _
6 to 12  13.98  29.24  49.47  23.80
12 to 24  6.25  23.83  33.50  55.40
More than 24  3.66  15.83  17.03  20.80
Number of spells  4,790  6,903  1,417  204
Source: Unemployment Registry,  1990-2000.
52Table XII  Hazard Estimates for Duration of Unemployment  Spell
Variables  Baseline  I  II  III  IV  V
Receives  unemployment  0.529
insurance (UI)  (0.011)  -----------  (0.009)
Duration of Ul (months)  0.852
__________________________  ~  ~  ~0.002)
Duration of Ul wl  high  0.838
replacement ratio  (0.007)
Duration of Ul w/ low  0.862
replacement ratio  (0.004)
Ul w/  high RR (=1)  0.532
(0.010)
U. w/ low RR (=1)  0.770'
_  _  _  __  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(0.018)
Received  Ul in the past  1.735  2.033
(0.0270  (0.034)
Female (=1)  0.958  0.928  0.926
(0.017)  (0.017#)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)
Married (=I)  1.097"  l.109'  I.  .114"  1.113-  1.111-  1.104-
(0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)
26-35  1.040  1.007  0.978  0.977  1.067  1.074
(0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.025)
36-45  1.017  1.003  1.025  1.019  1.069  1  .057
(0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)
46-55  0.978  0.983  1.078  68  1.053  1.022
(0.030)  (0.032)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.033)  (0.032)
56-65  0.874"  0.875  0.948  0.940  0.942  0.918
(0.048)  (0.049)  (0.055)  (0.055)  -(0.051)  (0.051)
Primary  1.816  1.893  1.989  1.989  1.772  1.743
(0.202)  (0.213)  (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.196)  (0.193)
Apprenticeship  3.994  4.491  4.975  4.987  3.700  3.544
_(0.442)  (0.504)  (0.579)  (0.581)  (0.408)  (0.391)
Secondary  3.413  4.483  5.397  5.412  3.976  3.828
_  (0.479  (0.545  (0.630)  (0.632  (0.440  (0423
College(+)  6.762  7.481  7.925  7.947"  6.099  5.916
(0.780)  (0.876)  (0.962)  (0.965)  (0.700  679)
No  previous exp.  1.129  1.257  1.352  1.090  1.046
(0.042)  (0.048)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.039)  (0.037)
Occupation  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
Sector  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
Region  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
Year  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
Quarter  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
Number if individuals  18,141  18,141  18,141  18,141  18,141  18,141
Number of spells  30,741  30,741  30,741  30,741  30,741  30,741
Number of pseudo-spells  30,741  30,741  30,741  30,741  39,711  46,577
Prob > Chi  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Source: Unemployment  Registry,  1990-2000.
Coefficients  represent hazard ratios  (Note:  A  hazard ration  greater (smaller)  than  I indicates  that such variable decreases
(increases) unemployment duration).
Robust standard errors in parentheses  (errors clustered at the individual level).
Significant at the 5 percent level.  Significant at the  10 percent  level.
Baseline comparison:  Illiterate single  male,  16-25 years  old, with previous  employment  experience,  but with no recorded
employment prior to current unemployment  spell.
Only  exit  to  employment  in the  private  sector  was  considered  as  a  successful  exit.  Qualitatively  and  quantitatively
equivalent results are obtained when exit to both employment  in the private sector and employment  in a public employment
program are considered instead.
53Table XIII  Hazard Estimates for Duration of Unem  ment Spell
Variables  Baseline  I  II  III
Receives  unemployment insurance  0.783  0.643
(UI)  (0.098)  (0.088)
Receives  social assistance/ support  0.481  0.470*
(SA)  (0.064)  (0.069)
Duration of UI (months)  0.815'
(0.029)
Duration of SA (months)  0.852
(0.043)
Received  UI in the past  0.950
______________  _  _(0.248)
Female (-1)  1.007  0.971  0.948  1.045
(0.129)  (0.125)  (0.121)  (0.134)
Married (=I)  1.070  1.117  1.147  1.111
(0.167)  ____  ___  (0.171)  (0.171)
26-35  0.966  1.034  0.988  0.993
(0.161)  (0.167)  (0.160)  (0.158)
36-45  0.977  1.016  0.959  1.003
(0.205)  (0.203)  (0.191)  (0.203)
46-55  1.075  0.992  1.014  1.059
(0.270)  (0.240)  (0.246)  (.254)
Apprenticeship  1.457  t.454  1.  1.318
(0.272)  (0.273)  (0.271)  (0.249)
Secondary  1.299  1.266  1.318  1.203
(0.254)  (0.248)  (0.262)  (0.239)
College(+)  3.522  3.504  3.565  4.104
C(0.972)  (3.9650  (0.992)  4.l0
No previous exp.  0.505"  0.580  0.514  0.682
(0.115)  (0.133)  (0.118)  (0.154)
Head of household  0.727  0.764  0.730  0.769
(0.148)  (0.147)  (0.140)  (0.151)
Spouse of head of household  0.657'  0.672  0.659  0.599
___________________________________  (0.152)  (0.148)  (0.142)  (0.133)
Number of children under 6 in  0.962
household  (0.124)
Household  dependency ratio  1.562
(0.496)
Other household member receives  1.252  1.283  1.115
UI  (0.202)  (0.208)  (0.187)
Other household member receives  0.966  0.927  0.891
SA  (0.146)  (0.141)  (0.133)
Occupation  YES  YES  YES  YES
Sector  YES  YES  YES  YES
Region  YES  YES  YES  YES
Year  YES  YES  YES  YES
Quarter  YES  YES  YES  YES
Number if individuals  2,465  2,465  2,465  2,465
Number of spells  2,465  2,465  2,465  2,465
Number of pseudo-spells  2,465  2,465  2,465  2,680
Prob > Chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Source:  Labor Force Survey  1996:1-1996:4,  1999:1-1999:4,  and 2000:1-2000:2.
Coefficients  represent  hazard  ratios  (Note:  A hazard  ration  greater (smaller)  than  I  indicates  that  such variable decreases
(increases) unemployment duration).
Robust standard errors in parentheses (errors clustered at the individual level).
Significant at the  5 percent level.  Significant at the  10 percent level.
Baseline comparison:  Single male,  16-25 years old, with primary studies and previous employment  experience  -low-skilled
occupation in agriculture. Not head of household,  nor spouse of head.
54Table XIV  Probability of Exit to Employment in the Private Sector (Marginal Effects)
Variables  Baseline  I  11  it1
Receives  unemployment  0.087  -0.413
insurance (UI)  (0.006)  (0.004)
Duration of spell  -0.006  -0.009  -0.009
(0.000)  0.  0003)  (0.0003)
UI w/  high replacement  ratio  -0.417"
(0.004)
UI w/  low  replacement ratio  -0.387
(0.003)
Ever received  UI  0.351  0.477
(0.005)  (0.005)
Female  (=1)  0.016'  0.022'  0.014  0.010
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  _(0.005)
Married (=1)  0.051  0.049"  0.040  0.030"
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)
26-35  0.043  0.047  0.055  0.052
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0,007)
36-45  0.075"  0.077  0.080  0.051
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)
46-55  0.066"  0.063  0.064  0.027
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)
56-65  0.018  0.018  0.025  -0.002
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.016)
Primary  0.135"  0.11￿'  0.094  0.092
(0.026)  (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.031)
Apprenticeship  0.321  0.20.208  0.185
(0.025)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.029)
Secondary  0.310  0.246  0.205  0.188-
(0.023)  (0.025)  (0.030)  (0.030)
Coltege(+)  0.339"  0.296  0.313"  0.316
(0.014)  (0.017)  (0.027)  _  _  (0.031)
No  previous exp.  0.029"  0.003  -0.040  -0.059
(0.012)  (0.012)  __(0o.  0  12  (0.01 1)
Occupation  YES  YES  YES  YES
Sector  YES  YES  YES  YES
Region  Y:ES  YES  YES  -YES
Year  YES  YES  YES  YES
Quarter  YES  YES  YES  _  YE S
Number if individuals  18,141  18,141  18,141  18,141
Number of spells  30,741  30,741  30,741  30,741
Number of pseudo-spells  30,741  30,741  39,711  46,577
Prob > Chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Source: Unemployment  Registry,  1990-2000.
Coefficients  represent marginal effects evaluated  at sample means.
Robust standard errors in parentheses  (errors clustered  at the individual  level).
Significant  at the 5 percent level.  Significant at the  10 percent level.
Baseline  comparison:  Illiterate  single  male,  16-25  years  old,  with  previous  employment  experience.  but  with  no  recorded
employment prior to current unemployment spell.
Only  exit  to  employment  in the  private  sector  was  considered  as  a  successful  exit.  Qualitatively  and  quantitatively
equivalent  results are obtained when  exit to both employment in the private sector and  employment in a public  employment
program are considered  instead.
55Table XV  Fraction of Workers Actively Searching  for a Job, by Unemployment Insurance  (UT)
Recipiency
Active search
Registered and present Ul  40.61l
Registered and past Ul  65.07 *
Registered and never UI  32.18*
Not registered  13.48"
Source: Labor Force Survey,  1996.1-1996.4,  1999.1-1999.4, and 2000.1-2000.4.
( ) Significantly different from closest value (from above/below) in the same
column at 5 percent (10 percent) level.
56Table XVI  Determinants  of Active Job Search
Sample  I  I.  III
proportions  1996/99  2000
Searching  65.30  l
Searching  actively  30.93
Unemployed  64.0A  A
Out of labor force  35.99A  _  *
Registered (=1)  66.38A  -0.046  -0.238**  0.320
(0.094?  (0.086)  (0.128)
No unemployment  50.62  -0.208  -0.163  -0.394"
insurance (UI)  (0.091)  (0.073)  (0.125)
Reg * No UI  25.15  0.163  0.166  0.319"
(0.113)  (0.098)  (0.108)
Past Ul  5.00  0.114  0.013  0.139
(0.050)  (0.045)  (0.082)
Receives  social  13.27  0.048  0.070  0.054
assistance/support  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.068)
Female (=1)  43.75  -0.066  -0.037  -0.134
(0.024)  (0.021)  (0.049)
Married (=1)  65.64  -0.053  -0.058  -0.009
(0.027)  (0.026  (0.052)
Head  37.61  0.080  0.107  -0.001
(0.033)  (0.032)  (0.067)
Spouse  26.66  0.042  0.052  0.048
(0.040)  (0.039)  (0.079)
16-25  20.17
[omitted]
26-35  21.20  0.014  0.008  -0.002
(0.029)  (0.026)  (0.060)
36-45  19.70  -0.010  -0.019  -0.018
(0.033)  (0.027_)  (0.074)
46-55  21.37  -0.107*  -0.086"  -0.143"
(0.031)*  (0.024)  (0.077)
55-65  17.56  -0.287*  -0.185  -0.356**
(0.021)  (0.016)  (0.080)
Primary  18.20
[omitted]
Apprent.  42.69  0.116  0.098*  0.117*
(0.030)  (0.031)  (0.053)
Secondary  35.24  0.150  0.138  0.176**
(0.031A  (0.033)  (0.053)
College(+)  3.87  0.120  0.162  0.109
(0.074)  (0.084)  (0.108)
Region  YES  YES  YES
Year  YES  YES  YES
Quarter  YES  YES  YES
Observed prob.  30.93  18.02  57.69
Predicted prob.  _  24.28  13.26  55.37
Prob > Chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000
Number of ind  2,494  2,494  1,331  1,163
Number of obs  5,033  5,033  3,395  1,638
Source: Labor Force  Survey  1996.1-1996.4,  1999.1-1999.4,  and 2000.1-2000.4.
ACorrespond  to the first observation  for each individual.
57Table XVII  Preference on Future Job, by Unemployment  Insurance  Reciienc
Total A  Salaried  Productiv  Entrepr.  Any job  Not
e coop.  decided
yet
Registered  and present Ul  1,919  87.65  0.57  0.47  10.01  1.30
Registered  and past U1  232  81.90  0.43  0.00  16.38  1.29
Registered  and never Ul  795  84.03  0.50  0.75  12.83  1.89
Not registered  253  76.28  0.00  5.53  15.02  3.16
Full time  Part time  No preference
|  Accept PT7
Registered and present Ul  87.04  19.82  2.30  10.66
Registered and past UT  82.76  15.10  1.72  15.52
Registered and never UI  87.67  26.96  2.89  9.43
Not registered  87.80  19.44  4.88  7.32
Source: Labor Force Survey  1996.1-1996.4,  1999.1-1999.4,  and 2000.1-2000.4.
A This information is  available  only for those workers who are looking for a job.
Table XVm  Povert  es for the Entire Population
Poverty measure  Minimum  Less than  Less than  Less than 50%
Subsistence  $2PPP/day  $4PPP/day  of median
Level  (per capita)  (per capita)  equivalent
Income definition  (MSL)  . income
Total income  (TT)  10.1  2.6  8.6  5.8
TI-_UIA  12.0  4.0  10.4  7.1
TI - SA/SSW  17.2  4.9  15.2  9.2
TI - all social income  18.7  6.2  16.6  10.7
Source: Microcensus,  1996.
A Unemployment Insurance.
B  Social Assistance/Support.
Note that pensions are always included in total income
Table XIX  Poverty Rates for Active and Unemployed Individuals
Poverty measure  Minimum  Less than  Less than  Less than 50% of
Subsistence Level  $2PPP/day  $4PPP/day  median
(per capita)  (per capita)  equivalent
Income definition  income
Active  Une  Active  Une  Active  Une  Active  Une
Total income (TI)  9.0  44.7  2.9  5.6  7.7  38.2  5.1  23.4
TI - UI A  10.0  63.2  3.2  26.9  8.6  57.9  5.4  42.9
TI - SAISS  12.5  42.2  3.3  15.8  10.8  37.5  6.4  25.6
TI - all social income  17.3  79.7  4.6  49.4  15.4  76.8  8.3  65.3
Source: Microcensus,  1996.
A Unemployment Insurance.
B  Social Assistance/Support.
Note that pensions are always included in total income.
58Table B3.I  Distribution of households  according to labor market status of head and spouse
Spouse  Employed  Employed  Unemployed  Not in labor force
Head  (At work)  (Not at work)
Employed  49  13  9  11
(At work)  [3]  [5]  [201  112]
Employed  2  2  1  1
(Not at work)  [1  101  Il1  101
Unemployed  3  1  3  2
[8]  [5]  [221  [15]
Not in labor force  1  0  1
10L  [3]  [31
Source: Labor Force Survey,  1996.1-1996.4,  1999.1-1999.4,  and 2000.1-2000.2.
Table B3.II  Distribution of Social Assistance
% receives SA  % of those  % une among  % NLF among
receiving SA  those w/SA  those w/SA
Head  6.44  40.05  88  9
Spouse  8.74  54.35  63 (67)A  30 (26)A
Other  0.42  5.60  98.5  1.5
Source: Labor Force Survey,  1996.1-1996.4,  1999.1-1999.4,  and 2000.1-2000.2.
A Not including maternity allowances.
59Table B3.III  Effect of Unemployment Insurance and Social Assistance  on labor force participation  and
active search of household head and spouse
Heads  |  Spouses
LFP  Act search 2000  LFP  Act search 2000
(NEmp)  (NEmp)  (NEmg)  (NEmp)
Receives  SA  0.376  0.372  0.441  0.045
(0.035)  (0.075)  (0.049)  (0.065)
Receives UI  981  0.325  0.477  0.311
(0.020)  (0.044)  (0.027)  (0.086)
Spouse receives SA  0.023  0.151
(0.042)  (0.078)
Spouse receives UI  0.066  0.060
(0.049)  (0.146)
Head receives  SA  0.004  0.054
(0.089)  (0.125)
Head receives Ul  -0.012  -0.109
(0.067)  (0140)
Female  -0.275"  -0.180  -0.204"  -0.229
(0.104)  (0.218)  (0.106)  (0.187)
Female * SA (=1)  -0.380  -0.6221
(0.165)  (0.204)
Apprenticeship  0.010  0.089  0.020  0.052
(0.039)  (0.089)  (0.054)  (0.093)
Secondary  0.023  -0.077  0.123"  0.228"
(0.045)  (0.114)  (0.054)  (0.100)
Higher + College  0.062  0.201  0.055  -0.015
(0.064)  (0.038)  (0.094)  (0.166)
Appr * SA  -0. 140"
(0.074)
Secondary * SA  -0.195"
(0.069)  _
HIigher * SA  -0.321
(0.140)
# children  -0.013  -0.036  0.011  0.040
(0.013)  (0.034)  (0.014)  (0.026)
# children < 6  0.011  -0.022  -0.201  -0.267
(0.017  _  (0.041)  (0.018)  (0.039)
No previous  exp.  -0.382  -0.177  -0.246"  -0.237"
(0.133)  (0.220)  (0.044)  (0.075)
Head/spouse LMS  YES  YES  YES  YES
Read/spouse  educ.  YES  YES  YES  YES
Region  YES  YES  YES  YES
Year  YES  YES  YES  YES
Quarter  YES  YES  YES  YES
Observed prob.  72.27  71.30  48.12  45.67
Predicted prob.  85.07  80.17  47.82  43.30
Prob. > Chi  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Number of obs.  1,804  359  4,081  659
Source: LFS  1996.1-1996.4,  1999.1-1999.4,  and 2000.-2000.4.
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